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ABSTRACT 
This thesis uses a public policy perspective to examine the individual and 
institutional factors that lead to, and the consequences of, split-ticket voting.  
Chapter 1 uses a new methodology to identify the individual-level variables 
that influence the levels of split-ticket voting, using Mexico as an example. I find 
that 25% of Mexican citizens split their ticket, an intermediate level in comparison 
with other countries such as the United States or Brazil. I also find evidence that 
the hypotheses of party identification and candidate appeal are viable 
explanations for split-ticket voting in Mexico. In addition to testing existing 
hypotheses, I also study and find differences in vertical and horizontal split-ticket 
voting.  
 Chapter 2 focuses on the institutional factors that influence voters to split 
their ballots. I review previously-reported institutional variables and test them in 
  vii 
13 countries using the CSES Module 3 dataset. I use a probit model to test the effect 
of institutional variables—political alliances, type of electoral formula, number 
and magnitude of electoral districts, institutionalization of democracy, and type of 
executive. To complement the econometric analysis, I conduct an experiment to 
test how the number of parties on a ballot affects split-ticket voting. I find evidence 
that institutions play a relevant role in this phenomenon and that increasing the 
number of parties in a ballot increases the probability of a split-ticket vote. 
Chapter 3 describes the policy effects of split-ticket voting by examining the 
allocation of federal transfers between subnational levels governed by different 
political parties. I use Mexico as a case study and the difference-in-differences 
methodology to test whether state governors favor municipalities governed by 
their same political party by granting more funding and projects of public works. 
Interviews with political actors suggest that governors’ influence to allocate 
resources at will have diminished as new actors have appeared. The results of the 
analysis of 2025 municipalities, during the period of 2014 and 2015, indicate that 
there is no partisan bias in the allocation of funds of the Ramo 23.  
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GLOSSARY 
Concurrent: Refers to elections at different levels of government (i.e.: Federal and 
Municipal level) happening at the same date. 
Election: In this document, “election” refers to a general election season. 
Governor: In all cases, “governor” is used to refer to the head of the executive 
branch of a state level of government.  
Mayor: “Mayor” is used in this document to refer to the equivalent of “municipal 
president”, or the head of the executive branch at a local level of government. 
While “mayor” is typically used for cities, it is possible for a municipal president 
to govern a rural area.  
Race: In this document, “race” is used to refer to a specific contest or vote for a 
specific position, in contrast to “election”, which is used to refer to a collective 
season of races.  
Split-ticket voting: Also “ticket splitting” or “splitting a ballot”. Refers to when a 
voter votes for candidates from different political parties in different races during 
a same election, as opposed to straight-ticket voting, where a voter chooses 
candidates from the same political party for every office up for election. 
  xvii 
Split, Vertical: When votes are cast for different political parties at different 
government levels, for example, when a voter chooses presidential and 
gubernatorial candidates from different parties. 
Split, Horizontal: When a citizen votes for different parties in similar seats, for 
example, when voting for two congressional representatives (possible in mixed 
electoral systems, such as Mexico).  
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CHAPTER ONE - ANALYZING SPLIT - TICKET VOTING IN MEXICO’S 
2012 ELECTIONS 
Abstract 
While the factors that lead citizens to split their ballots between different 
parties have been analyzed in different countries with increasingly sophisticated 
methods, this phenomenon has not yet been comprehensively explored in Mexico. 
The analysis of split-ticket voting in Mexico’s case sheds light of this phenomenon 
in second wave democracies and at the same time, allows to compare the results 
to other countries. In this paper, I use these new methods on aggregate data to 
measure the levels of split-ticket voting in Mexico, and the most recent data to test 
the individual level hypotheses that explain this phenomenon. My research found 
that in 2012, 25 percent of Mexican citizens voted for different parties, an 
intermediate level of split-ticket voting compared to other countries such as the 
United States or Brazil. I found evidence suggesting that the hypotheses of party 
identification and candidate appeal are contributing factors to split-ticket voting. 
The hypothesis of policy balancing, prevalent in the American literature, 
surprisingly lacked strength in the Mexican context. In addition to testing existing 
previously-published hypotheses, I analyzed vertical and horizontal split-ticket 
voting, finding differences in them across Mexico. The split-ticket voting rate is 
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larger for the presidential and congressional representation elections, and even 
more between presidential and mayoral elections. This work implements an 
updated quantitative approach to the study of split-ticket voting in Mexico and 
contributes to the literature by presenting evidence of the factors behind vertical 
and horizontal split-ticket voting.  
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Introduction 
Although the literature on split-ticket voting is vast in the United States, in 
other countries this is still unexplored territory. The study of this phenomenon in 
other countries represents an opportunity to understand more about the 
individual and institutional factors that influence it. For example, studies in 
Germany and New Zealand have shown that institutional settings such as a mixed 
electoral system increases the likelihood of a person casting her vote for different 
parties (See Karp et al 2002 and Gschwend, 2007). Also, research in countries such 
as Brazil helps to understand the phenomenon in contexts where candidate-
centered campaigns dominate or where voters choose among multiple parties 
(Ames et al., 2008). Studying the phenomenon of split-ticket voting in other 
countries has contributed to testing the hypotheses that originated in the United 
States. 
The study of Mexico adds to the existing literature on split-ticket voting in 
mixed electoral systems, allowing comparisons with countries such as Germany 
and New Zealand. At the same time, it allows for exploring this phenomenon in a 
context of a recent democracy, as Mexico has witnessed a transition from a 
hegemonic regime to a democracy. In this regard, the results of this study can be 
compared to those countries such as Brazil, where old and new parties are 
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adapting to the electoral competition. In this way, Mexico’s characteristics allow 
to test four hypotheses, that explain the levels of split-ticket voting, found in the 
literature of different countries. 
In Mexico, the causes of split-ticket voting have not been studied in depth 
because of the type of data available to researchers. First of all, the rate of split-
ticket voting is not recorded at the electoral posts so is not possible to track the 
individual´s voting decisions as in other countries such as New Zealand. As a 
consequence, some studies have extrapolated conclusions from the analysis of 
aggregate data (Crow, 2005; Ochoa and Saracho, 2006) or have recurred to 
individual level data available the Mexico Panel Data for the 2000 election.  
The surge of new methodologies to address aggregate data problems as 
well as new individual data on a different election (the 2012 Mexico Panel Survey) 
allows for a revision of what we know on split ticket voting in Mexico and to test 
for existing hypothesis on the factors that cause it. In particular, I will test three 
existing theories in the literature on the individual factors that influence citizens’ 
decision to split their vote. This is possible due to the characteristic of Mexico. I 
will argue that by using the 2012 election it is possible to better assess not only the 
levels of split-ticket voting but also to add to the literature on voting behavior in 
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Mexico by adding evidence on differences between vertical and horizontal ticket 
splitting. 
As a first step, this paper measures the levels of split-ticket voting in Mexico 
using both individual and aggregate level data. I find that compared to other 
countries, the levels of split-ticket voting in Mexico lie in the middle of the 
spectrum. If we consider a strict approach on split-ticket voting and count the 
percentage of voters who split their vote at least in one electoral race (in the 2012 
elections, voters received four ballots for different elections) then the split-ticket 
voting rate reaches up to 25%. But if we look across specific races, the rates of split-
ticket voting can vary from 14.8% in President-Deputies ballots (vertical split-
ticket voting) to 9.8% in the President-State governor ballots (horizontal split-ticket 
voting), which suggests that vertical splitting is more frequent than horizontal 
splitting. The analysis using aggregate data shows that the Democratic 
Revolutionary Party (Partido de la Revolución Democrática, PRD) is the party that 
is most affected by the split-ticket voting since in 67% of the municipalities that 
had concurrent elections, the PRD presidential candidate received more votes than 
the PRD mayor candidate.  
Analyzing aggregate data with the Thomsen method for ecological 
inference (1987) allows us to estimate the percentage of voting transferred from 
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one party to another.1 In this regard, I found that Josefina Vazquez Mota, the PAN 
presidential candidate, lost 28% votes to the PRI deputies. There is also a frequent 
split-ticket voting across the PAN (right) and the PRI (center), while there are few 
splitters across the PAN and the PRD (left). While this could suggest that ideology 
influences the levels of split-ticket voting I didn’t find evidence of this when using 
individual level data. 
In a second step, I tested three hypotheses found in the prevailing literature 
that characterize citizens’ motivation to split their vote. By running a multivariate 
statistical analysis of the 2012 Panel Survey I found evidence that supports two of 
the three hypotheses. Surprisingly, the policy balancing hypothesis that emerged 
in the U.S. electoral context was not supported by the data. This finding might 
suggest that electoral institutions, beyond individual motivations, play also an 
important role in the level of split-ticket voting. The role of institutions is analyzed 
in Chapter 2. 
Literature Review on Split-Ticket Voting 
While split-ticket voting commonly refers to a citizen voting for one party 
in presidential elections and a different one in congressional elections, the concept 
 
1 A detailed description of the Thomsen method can be found in the following sections 
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is wider and can be applied to all electoral races. Burden and Helmke state that “a 
ticket is split if voter i votes for party j in contest r and votes for party ~ j in some 
other contest” (p. 2, 2009), highlighting the variability inherent in defining a split-
ticket vote. According to these authors’ definition, there are two classes of split-
ticket voting: vertical and horizontal. Horizontal split-ticket voting is when a 
citizen votes for different parties in similar positions, for example, when voting for 
two congressional representatives (possible in mixed electoral systems, such as 
Mexico). Vertical splitting is when votes are cast for different political parties at 
different government levels, for example, when a voter chooses presidential and 
gubernatorial candidates from different parties. 
Table 1. Ticket splitting types 
 Concurrent Non-concurrent 
Horizontal Mixed member system 
elections 
Staggered multi-member 
elections 
Vertical Presidential-legislative 
elections 
Midterm and by-
elections 
Source: Burden and Helmke (p.3, 2009) 
Yet, why does split-ticket voting occur? And why should it be studied? This 
phenomenon first drew interest in the United States, as divided government 
became more frequent. The idea that a divided government was the cause of 
legislative deadlock led researchers to look into split-ticket voting. Since then, the 
study of split-ticket voting has extended to other countries, each with their own 
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party systems and electoral rules, demonstrating that split-ticket voting has 
different causes and consequences. 
The existing literature classifies split-ticket voting in two categories: 
intentional or unintentional split-ticket voting. Intentional split-ticket voting refers 
to people making strategic voting decisions based on available information 
(Gschwend, 2007; Karp et al 2002; Helmke 2009; Arian and Weiss, 1969; Fiorina 
1996; Kedar, 2005, 2006) whereas unintentional split-ticket voting is commonly 
related to structural explanations such as ballot design or electoral institutions 
(Campbell and Miller, 1957; McAllister and Darcy, 1992; Shugart, 1995; Calvo et al 
2008; Burden 2009). 
Structural explanations of unintentional split-ticket voting are elements 
intrinsic to the electoral or political system. Ballot design is the first element that 
determines whether voters are given the option to split their ballot or not. In one 
of the first studies on split-ticket voting in the United States, Campbell and Miller 
(1957) found that differences in ballot design across states influence levels of split-
ticket voting. These authors describe how states with a single ballot for all electoral 
races tend to have higher straight ticket voting levels than those states with 
multiple ballots. McAllister and Darcy’s (1992) study of the 1988 elections in the 
United States also supports Campbell and Miller’s findings that differences in 
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ballot designs across states account for split-ticket voting levels. Ballot design is 
also relevant to the topic in terms of the information presented to voters. For 
example, Calvo et al. (p. 202, 2008), in an experiment conducted in Argentina, finds 
that “ballots that highlight candidate-centric information induced higher split 
ticket rates than ballots reinforcing party-centric information.”  
Another structural factor that favors unintentional split-ticket voting is the 
absence of candidates. In Japan’s case, Burden (2009) argues that it is common for 
some parties to not have representatives contending for all open positions. 
Candidates’ absence increases split-ticket voting levels because voters are forced 
to choose representatives from other parties. In a different argument, Shugart 
(1995) finds that the existence of staggered elections increases the chance of split-
ticket voting. In both cases, institutional constraints play a relevant role in split-
ticket voting. 
Intentional split-ticket voting is described in the literature as when people 
either choose different parties due to strategic considerations (an example is policy 
balancing theory) or due to sincere preference voting (for example when a local 
party does not have a represent at the national level). Intentional split-ticket voting 
motivated by strategic considerations is often associated with individual factors, 
which is the object of study in this paper. The most explored current of this theory 
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refers to the idea that people, by splitting their vote, aim for a balanced policy 
outcome (Alesina and Rosenthal, 1989, 1995; Fiorina 1994, 1996; Ingberman and 
Villani, 1993; Lacy and Niou, 1998; Lacy and Paolino, 1998; Mebane, 2000; Scheve 
and Tomz, 1999; Lewis-Beck and Nadeau, 2004; Smith et al., 1999; Tarrance and 
DeVries, 1998; Kedar, 2005, 2006). The policy-balancing theory has its origins in 
Downs (1957), who argues that people prefer the polices that are nearest to their 
ideal points. This theory has been extensively studied in the setting of the United 
States, where two parties dominate the political arena, and it is based on the 
assumption that actors are rational and fully informed by the parties’ policy 
positions (Downs, 1957). Under this view, split-ticket voting could be understood 
as voters’ efforts to moderate policies by choosing opposing parties.  
Several studies on divided government in the United States support the 
theory of strategic balancing. Alesina and Rosenthal (1989, 1995) and Fiorina (1994) 
are the main scholars who argue that a consequence of policy divergences is the 
motivation for Americans splitting their votes. Alesina and Rosenthal (1989, 1995) 
claim that Americans favor opposition in Congress during midterm elections in an 
attempt to counterbalance the presidents’ policies. Fiorina (1994) asserts that 
parties at the local level adopt different policy approaches, which has contributed 
to the rise of divided government in different states of the U.S. Other studies used 
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varied research methods to provide evidence in favor of the theory of strategic 
balancing. For example, Carsey and Layman’s (2004) study using a new data set 
supports the theory that voters’ final goal when voting a split ticket is a divided 
government. Using game theory, Ingberman and Villani (1993) argue that parties 
adopt divergent policies that promote split-ticket voting. Finally, Grofman et al. 
(2000) analyze median voter preferences in each district and also find that 
divergence in policy positions favors split-ticket voting. It is important to note that 
these studies are based on evidence gathered from U.S. elections and dated in the 
1990s, a period characterized by the rise of hyper-partisanship. 
Other studies can be defined as derivations of the theory of strategic 
balancing. Lacy and Paolino (1998) argue that split-ticket voting is the result of 
voters taking policy outcomes into account instead of candidates’ policy positions. 
In a different approach, Mebane’s (2000) research shows that a divided 
government is the result of voters splitting their tickets in a coordinated manner 
and not as a random decision. Finally, Chhibber and Kollman’s (2004) comparative 
research suggests that the strategic balancing theory can also be fueled by 
differences in policy agendas across government levels, as in the cases of India and 
Canada, where the national and local party systems are not comparable. These 
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studies have shown that policy balancing theory can find support in contexts 
outside the United States. 
Intentional split-ticketing can also describe situations when voters split 
their votes by voting for parties that are not their first choice or when they split 
their votes because they genuinely want to vote for specific candidates even if they 
are from different parties. Helmke (2009) and Saunders et al. (2005) argue that 
when there is a paucity of information on how a party in a new democracy will 
perform, people tend to minimize risks by splitting their votes. According to these 
authors, split-ticket voting works as an insurance policy for electoral results. Other 
studies suggest that voters follow their true preferences, even when that means 
voting a split ticket. In particular, this has proven to be the case in mixed electoral 
systems where the proportional representation (PR) votes are considered to be 
based on true preferences while votes for single member district (SMD) 
representatives respond to other considerations, such as coalition expectations 
(Gschwend, 2007; Bawn, 1999; Karp et al., 2002). There is evidence that this is the 
case in countries such as Germany (Bawn, 1999) and New Zealand (Karp et al., 
2002). Another situation in which split-ticket voting is due to sincere preferences 
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is when there is a clear distinction between local and national party systems, as in 
Israel (Arian and Weiss, 1969) or Denmark (Elkit and Kjaer, 2005).2  
Figure 1. Split-Ticket Voting Explanations 
Source: Own analysis and elaboration. 
Beyond explanations about intentional or unintentional reasoning, 
researchers have also focused on other elements that influence voters to split their 
ballots. Alternative explanations include those that focus on campaign effects 
(Burden and Kimball, 1998; Calvo, Escolar and Pomares, 2008; Karp and Garland, 
2007), candidate quality (Roscoe, 2003; Burden, 2009), party organization strength 
(Karp, et al., 2002; Gschwend, Johnston and Pattie, 2003; Helmke, 2009; Ames, 
Baker and Renno, 2008; McAllister and White, 2000), or voter sophistication 
 
2 This differs from the cases of India and Canada describes above as the intention is not balancing 
public policy. 
Split-Ticket 
Voting 
Explanations
Intentional
Strategic 
Balancing
Sincere Split-
ticket
Unintentional
Structural 
Explanations
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(Takahashi, 2007). These factors are also considered in the analysis of split-ticket 
voting in Mexico in the sections that follow. 
It is clear that there is extensive literature on split-ticket voting in the United 
States; yet, there is a paucity of published literature on this subject in other 
countries. Studying this phenomenon in other countries offers a richness of 
experiences that allows for deeper understanding of the individual and 
institutional factors that influence split-ticket voting. For example, studies in 
Germany and New Zealand have shown that institutional settings—such as a 
mixed electoral system—increase the likelihood of a person casting their vote for 
different parties (See Karp et al 2002 and Gschwend, 2007). Studies, such as that 
done by Ames et al. (2008) in Brazil, have also lent greater understanding to this 
phenomenon in countries where candidate-centered campaigns dominate or 
where voters choose from multiple parties. In this sense, the study of the Mexican 
case is relevant as this country has the political conditions to test for an ample 
variety of institutional settings. 
Split-Ticket Voting in Mexico 
The particularities of the party and electoral systems in Mexico make it an 
interesting case study for testing the individual factors involved in split-ticket 
voting. Mexico is a federation, and its government is divided into three branches: 
15 
 
executive, legislative, and judicial. The president and the state governors are 
elected every six years, while city mayors are elected every three years. Congress 
is bicameral; representatives from the upper chamber (senators) are elected every 
six years, and representatives from the lower chamber (deputies) are elected every 
three years. Lower chamber representatives are elected through a mixed electoral 
system in which 300 deputies are elected under majority rule (first-past-the-post 
method) and 200 under proportional representation rule. The Senate is made up 
of 128 senators who are elected every six years, running concurrently with the 
president. Federal and state elections are not all concurrent. At the local level, 
states have their own electoral calendars, and some state elections are scheduled 
at the same time as federal elections. 
Mexico’s party system is dominated by three major parties that draw a large 
percentage of the votes: the PRI, the PAN, and the PRD.3 While minor parties may 
run candidates for the presidency, they typically form alliances with larger parties. 
The effectiveness of the multiparty system is relatively new. The PRI was 
hegemonic for over 70 years, with opposition parties only beginning to gain terrain 
in local and state elections in the mid-1980s and a PAN president being elected 
 
3 In the 2006 and 2012 elections these three major parties garnered around 90 percent of the votes. 
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only recently, in 2000. At the time of the 2012 elections, the period this paper 
focuses on, the PAN occupied the presidency and governed in seven states while 
the PRD governed in three states. At that same moment, the PRI held 47 percent 
of the deputy seats in Congress, the PAN, 28 percent, and the PRD, 14 percent. 
In comparison to other countries, research on split-ticket voting in Mexico 
is scarce, and there have been few studies on this phenomenon. Crow’s research 
(2005) shows that split-ticket voting in the 2000 presidential election was 16.2 
percent—13.56 percent split their votes between president and federal deputy, 
16.23 percent between president and senator, and 8.99 percent between deputy 
and senator. According to Crow, Mexicans intentionally split their vote in order to 
have a divided government, suggesting that policy balancing is the prevalent 
hypothesis that explains this phenomenon in Mexico. He also found that all sectors 
of Mexican society were equally likely to split their tickets in the 2000 election.  
Takahashi (2007) explores split-ticket voting between the Mexican 
congressional and presidential election in 2000. Although this author does not 
measure the levels of split-ticket voting, he does focus on the factors that influence 
voters. This author argues that voters’ levels of political sophistication explain 
current levels of ballot splitting. As socioeconomic levels decrease, the probability 
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of split-ticket voting increases (Takahashi, 2007). Weak partisanship also 
contributes to an increased likelihood that voters will split their ballots. 
Helmke (2009) also studies split-ticket voting in Mexico. She used the first 
iteration of the Mexico Panel Study—carried out in 2000— instead of aggregate 
data to measure the levels of split-ticket voting. She argues that ballot splitting 
works as voters’ insurance policy in a political context of uncertainty. Finally, 
Laborde et. al (2012) explored the possibility that clientelism could propitiate split-
ticket voting in Mexico, but they did not find evidence to support the claim that 
gifts from parties during election campaigns caused voters to split their ballot. 
While the existing studies on split-ticket voting in Mexico represent a step 
forward in understanding individual factors relevant to the phenomenon, their 
conclusions lack consistency. Indeed, certain authors report contradicting 
findings. For example, some authors argue that socioeconomic factors influence 
voters’ decisions to choose different parties (Takahashi, 2007) while others reject 
this theory (Crow, 2005). 
It is important to note that the majority of studies on split-ticket voting in 
Mexico use the 2000 iteration of the Mexico Panel Study as the main data source. 
The Mexico Panel Study is a survey research project on Mexico’s election 
campaigns that has been in operation since the 2000 general elections; the 2012 
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Mexico Panel Study is the third iteration of the general election series. It is a face-
to-face survey that asks a series of questions about voting patterns and political 
preferences to a random stratified sample of eligible Mexican voters who are 
interviewed in person before and after the elections. In the post-election wave, the 
survey asks for people’s voting decisions during the electoral races for the 
president, governors, senators, and federal deputies. This wave includes more 
than 800 observations and is a statistically representative sample of those who 
report casting a valid vote on Election Day. The data gathered is intended to be a 
resource for scholars working on campaigns, public opinion, voting behavior, and 
political communication. Data is gathered in separate surveys over the course of 
the campaign and following the election using a hybrid panel/cross-sectional 
design.  
While the Mexico Panel Study has always been useful, it can justifiably be 
argued that the 2000 and 2006 elections were atypical, as in the first one the country 
completed its transition to an electoral democracy and the second one was marked 
by post-electoral conflicts. It therefore follows that a reanalysis of the split-ticket 
voting phenomenon in Mexico using a new data set on a different election as well 
as other statistical methodologies is necessary. This new analysis will not only 
allow for assessing the validity of the hypotheses found in the literature in other 
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countries but also for reviewing previous findings in Mexican literature. 
Additionally, this paper will add to the literature by exploring other types of split-
ticket voting, such as the differences between vertical and horizontal split-ticket 
voting. 
As existing literature in Mexico is based on the 2000 Mexico Panel Study, it 
is relevant to reflect on the unique context of that election process. It was during 
this election year that the PRI lost the presidency for the first time in over 70 years. 
Several explanations point to a singular convergence of factors that led to the PRI’s 
electoral defeat, suggesting this election was atypical (Green, 2007; Chand, 2001; 
Magaloni, 2006; Klesner, 2005). During this electoral process, the PAN candidate 
portrayed himself as the only one capable of defeating the PRI; his campaign 
slogan was “the vote for change.” The PAN candidate was able to get support from 
other parties’ voters because they felt he had a chance at beating the PRI. Within 
this context, split-ticket voting rates would have been atypical in this election, 
since there was an element of voting for or against the regime and any attempt at 
generalizing the results of the analysis surrounding the motivations behind voters’ 
decisions to split their ballots will lack external validity.  
The 2006 election can be characterized by an unusual ideological 
polarization. In addition, this election was highly controversial, to such an extent 
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that the results were disputed in courts and there was a post-electoral social unrest. 
The electoral court ruled that the PAN won the presidency and defeated the PRD 
by a margin of less than 1 percent of the votes. Researchers link the close election 
results to a major ideological polarization during the presidential campaign 
(Moreno, 2009). This election was characterized by the use of negative campaigns. 
The PAN candidate launched a media campaign portraying the PRD candidate as 
“a danger to Mexico,” polarizing voters to the left and right of the political 
spectrum and leading to a close election. As a result, the levels of split-ticket voting 
were as unusual in the 2006 elections as they were in 2000. For example, only 10 
percent of the PAN voters split their ballots. This differs from other elections 
where vote-splitters came from all parties. 
Therefore, when compared to the 2000 and 2006 elections, an analysis of the 
2012 election will provide an understanding of the split-ticket phenomenon under 
a more stable political context. On July 1, 2012, the president, 128 senators, 500 
deputies, 6 governors, and nearly 900 mayors were elected. In this election, the PRI 
won the presidency by a difference of 7 percent of the votes over the PRD. While 
there were claims of vote-buying practices, the electoral court ruled in favor of the 
PRI, and no major protest followed the court’s decision. It is also important to 
mention that the three main parties obtained almost 97 percent of the valid votes. 
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In these elections, 50,143,616 Mexicans voted, representing 63 percent of registered 
voters, a typical level of participation by international standards. 
Estimation Methods on Split-Ticket Voting 
While international literature has allowed for a wider vision on nuances in 
split-ticket voting, researchers around the world face the same difficulty when 
trying to measure this phenomenon. The main issue is the fact that few electoral 
systems record each person’s vote for different races; they only record aggregate 
results. This leaves researchers with the option of either using aggregate level data 
or individual survey data. 
When there is no official public recorded data on how each individual 
voted, individual survey data becomes a great tool for researchers. However, in 
some countries, this type of data is not available and even when it is, researchers 
must take bias into account (Abramson and Claggett, 1991; Silver, Anderson and 
Abramson, 1986; Wright, 1990). It is well-documented that there is a tendency for 
people to misreport their voting decisions in post-electoral surveys (Belli et al., 
1999; Presser, 1990). While aggregate data might seem like a feasible option to at 
least measure the magnitude of the split-ticket voting in a country, it definitely has 
disadvantages. 
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Measuring split-ticket voting using aggregate data has proven to be a 
challenge (King, 1997; Burden and Helmke, 2009) due to the ecological fallacy 
(Selvin, 1958). The way in which each vote is counted and recorded represents a 
challenge for researchers looking to explain individual electoral behavior. As only 
aggregate data is recorded, it is not possible to measure the proportion of those 
who voted a split ticket. For example, in the 2012 elections in Mexico, it is possible 
to know how many people voted for each presidential candidate and for each 
party in the local races, but it is not possible to measure the differences in votes 
and to calculate the number of people who casted a straight-ticket vote (See Table 
2 below).  
Table 2. Voting Decision for City Mayor in the Municipality of Palizada, in the 
State of Campeche  
  City Mayor Voting Decision 
  PAN PRI PRD Others Abstain Total 
Presidential 
Voting 
Decision 
PAN ? ? ? ? ? 1,408 
PRI ? ? ? ? ? 1,831 
PRD ? ? ? ? ? 678 
Others ? ? ? ? ? 1,054 
Abstain ? ? ? ? ? 173 
 Total 2,304 2,412 121 158 149 5,144 
Source: INE historical dataset 
Different methods have been developed to address the problem posed by 
the ecological fallacy. Numerous previously-published articles outline a wide 
variety of approaches: the method of bounds (Duncan and Davis, 1953); 
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Goodman’s ecological regression (1953, 1959); King’s ecological inference method 
(1997); Thomsen’s method (1987); and the entropy-maximizing estimation method 
(Johnston et al., 1982; Johnston and Pattie, 2000; Elff, Gschwend and Johnston, 
2007). Each of these methodologies has its strengths and weaknesses. 
The method of bounds uses available information to estimate an interval of 
possible cell frequencies that must be true. However, while informative, this 
method is not useful, as the range could be too wide to draw conclusions. 
Therefore, Goodman (1959) adapted this methodology using a regression to 
estimate all possible proportions from the known aggregate results. The 
assumption behind this is that the unknown parameters are constant across all 
observations. The downside of Goodman’s ecological regression is that it tends to 
overestimate the proportions, showing intervals beyond 100 percent of the votes 
cast (see Burden and Kimball, 2002, p. 48). King’s ecological inference method was, 
therefore, designed to improve on both the method of bounds and Goodman’s 
ecological regression. While King’s method uses a probabilistic approach to 
counter some of the weaknesses of previous methods, it also relies on several 
assumptions that are difficult to satisfy (Cho, 1998; Freedman et al. 1998; McCue, 
2001; Rivers 1998). Thomsen’s method attempts to generate a model with simpler 
assumptions and uses a logit approach instead of a linear regression. While the 
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assumptions of this model are simple, the logit model results in overestimation of 
voter stability (Thomsen et al., 1991). Finally, the entropy-maximizing estimation 
method uses a mathematical procedure—instead of a statistical one—to identify 
the most likely result, and it uses both an individual level survey as well as 
aggregate data (Johnston and Pattie, 2000). One of the criticisms about it is that this 
method requires additional individual level data, which could introduce bias or 
sampling error problems (Cleave, Brown and Payne, 1995). 
Burden and Helmke (p. 4, 2009) summarize the existing forms to analyze 
split-ticket voting in three branches: survey data, aggregate data results, and 
ecological inference methods. As each method has both positive and negative 
aspects, researchers should use all three of them to describe the split-ticket 
phenomenon more accurately. Following Burden and Helmke’s recommendation, 
I will take advantage of the survey and aggregate data gathered from the 2012 
election. For the ecological inference method, I will analyze the existing aggregate 
data using Thomsen’s method, which has proven to be quite stable across different 
settings and contexts (Thomsen et al., 1991; Cleave et al., 1995; Park et.al., 2014) 
and with estimates closer to the true vote proportions than other strategies such 
as s King’s (1997) ecological inference method (Park, 2008a), which does not 
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recover important patters in the data. This paper uses Thomsen’s (1987) estimator 
implemented via his ECOL software. 
Descriptive Analysis  
A general election was held in July 2012 in Mexico where voters received 
four ballots, one for each position in dispute (president, PR deputies, majority 
deputies, and senators). In addition, citizens of the states of Chiapas, Guanajuato, 
Jalisco, Morelos, Tabasco, and Yucatán voted for state governor and city mayors. 
The differences in the percentage of votes received by each party in the election 
indicate the presence of split-ticket voting. 
Even though the PRI won the majority of the elections, there are still 
differences in the voting results that might indicate the presence of split-ticket 
voting (see Table 3). For example, the PRD finished a close second to the PRI in the 
presidential election but lacked voters’ support at the municipal level and in 
Congress. At the same time, the PAN’s candidates did well in congressional 
elections (winning 114 seats of 500) but only won one governorship out of the six 
in dispute (obtaining only 21 percent of all the votes across the six gubernatorial 
races). 
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Table 3. Election 2012 Results (Vote %) 
 Presidency Senate Deputies Governorships Municipalities 
PRI 38% 30% 32% 38% 33% 
PAN 25% 26% 26% 21% 23% 
PRD 31% 18% 18% 29% 21% 
Source: INE historical dataset, State Electoral Institutes and CIDAC Electoral data set 
Figures 2 and 3, on the next page, illustrate how the difference in the 
percentage of voting varied in the 2012 election, not only across parties but also 
according to the type of race. Certain trends emerged from a closer analysis of the 
election results from these 2,457 municipalities. For example, in terms of parties, 
the PRD appeared to be the party that displayed a larger difference in terms of the 
votes it received for the presidential and municipal races. Additionally, the PRI is 
the party with the tightest fit between municipal and presidential vote. The 
aggregate electoral results in figures 2 and 3 also show that vertical split-ticket 
voting appeared to be larger than horizontal split-ticket voting. The differences in 
voting percentages are smaller between proportional representation and majority 
deputies than between presidential and municipal elections 
In the case of the PRD, in 67 percent of all municipalities that held elections, 
the percentage of votes for its presidential candidate exceeded the percentage of 
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votes cast for its city mayoral candidate. A similar situation occurred with the PRI: 
its congressional candidates received a larger percentage of the vote than its 
presidential candidate in 99 percent of the municipalities (see Table 4). This 
suggests that Mexican voters split their ballots differently depending on the 
political parties involved. 
Figure 2. An example of vertical ticket-splitting. Percentage of votes each party 
received in both the presidential (x axis) and the municipalities’ race (y axis) 
Source: INE historical dataset, State Electoral Institutes 
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Figure 3. An example of horizontal split- ticket voting. Percentage of votes each 
party coalition received in both the Deputies PR (x axis) and the Deputies MR 
race (y axis).  
Source: INE historical dataset 
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Table 4. Number of municipalities where each party received more votes in the 
presidential race than in the congressional and local elections 
 Congressional election City Mayor Election 
# Municipalities % # Municipalities  % 
Vazquez- PAN 1,059 43 393 53 
Peña- PRI 29 1 284 39 
AMLO- PRD 1,193 49 491 67 
Source: INE historical dataset, State Electoral Institutes 
While aggregate data suggest the existence of split-ticket voting in Mexico, 
a method of ecological inference is necessary to measure its magnitude. Thomsen’s 
method makes it possible to estimate the levels of split-ticket voting and the voter 
mobility between parties. The Thomsen estimator exhibits certain characteristics 
that permit it to generate estimates from aggregate data that are close to the 
individual-level estimates. 
Estimation of the Levels of Split-Ticket Voting in Mexico 
As mentioned above, the logit method of ecological inference has its 
assumptions, advantages and shortcomings. In terms of assumptions, this method 
is based on two: isomorphism (which means that the variation between 
individuals has the same structure as the variation between districts), and the 
assumption of a very high ratio of individual variance to ecological variance. In 
terms of advantages, the estimates of this method have been found to be very close 
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to true vote proportion when tested in different countries (Thomsen et al., 1991; 
Cleave et al., 1995; Park et.al., 2014). This method has been criticized for producing 
conflicting estimates when comparing them with survey results. However, these 
differences have been linked to social desirability issues of poll respondents rather 
than to the method itself.  
The logit method for ecological inference equates the individual level 
fourfold correlation with the ecological logit Pearson correlations. The logit 
method for ecological inference is an effort to develop a new technique for 
ecological inference based on the latent structure theory. The latent structure 
theory assumes that the probability of a certain choice is a function of a latent 
variable associated with each individual (Thomsen, 1987). The latent structure 
theory argues that there exist a number of latent factors that explain electoral 
behavior in the first election as well as electoral behavior in the second election. 
Table 5 shows the results of the logit method for ecological inference. 
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Table 5. Results of the logit method for ecological inference 
  President 
and 
Congress 
President 
and  
Mayor 
Senate 
and 
Deputies 
PR 
Deputies 
and MR 
Deputies 
Straight 
voting 
PAN and 
PAN 
56.6% 46.3% 60.0% 94.0% 
PRI and 
PRI 
53.8% 41.3% 63.9% 93.8% 
PRD and 
PRD 
45.1% 32.7% 70.6% 93.8% 
Split-
ticket 
voting 
PAN and 
PRI 
28.8% 27.3% 22.6% 3.8% 
PAN and 
PRD 
1.8% 9.5% 1.2% 0.1% 
PRI and 
PAN 
25.0% 25.8% 20.9% 3.4% 
PRI and 
PRD 
5.7% 14.8% 3.4% 0.5% 
PRD and 
PAN 
6.4% 10.5% 2.0% 0.2% 
PRD and 
PRI 
16.1% 31.9% 6.6% 1.0% 
Source: Own analysis and elaboration 
Thomsen’s method suggests that the highest party loyalty rates appear in 
horizontal elections, meaning when choosing between PR deputies and MR 
deputies or between senators and deputies. For example, more than 90 percent of 
voters from the three main parties in Mexico cast a straight ticket when selecting 
between PR deputies and MR deputies despite having filled out different physical 
ballots. The opposite occurred between presidential and local elections when 67 
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percent of voters divided their ballot by choosing the PRD presidential candidate 
and a mayoral candidate from another party. 
When comparing across parties in the presidential and congressional 
electoral races, Figure 3 shows an almost equal transfer of votes between the PRI 
and the PAN. 28 percent of the people who voted in favor of Josefina Vazquez 
Mota (PAN’s presidential candidate) voted for the PRI’s candidate for Congress, 
while 25 percent of those who cast a ballot in favor of Peña Nieto (PRI’s 
presidential candidate) also chose a PAN candidate for Congress. On the PRD side, 
the phenomenon of split-ticket voting between the PRD and the PAN was rather 
small (only 6 percent), which might reflect their ideological distance. Similar 
conclusions could be drawn when looking at split-ticket voting in presidential and 
city mayoral elections. The presence of split-ticket voting was larger between the 
PRI and PAN voters, while PRD voters were reluctant to split their ballots in favor 
of the PAN. These results suggest that split-ticket voting could have been 
motivated by party identification and ideology since fewer votes were transferred 
between a left-wing party (the PRD) and a right-wing party (the PAN). 
Despite the fact that aggregate level data offered important information 
about voters’ behavior, it was important to complement the analysis using 
individual level data to compensate for estimation biases. In particular, Thomsen’s 
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method tends to overestimate the amount of split-ticket voting (Cleave et.al. 1995). 
It was possible to complement the results obtained through ecological inference 
estimation by taking advantage of the individual survey data that was gathered 
during the 2012 Mexico Panel Study. 
Voters’ answers to the survey (Table 6) showed that levels of split-ticket 
voting in Mexico are rather low, compared to countries such as Brazil where it is 
around 70 percent (Ames et al., 2008). The individual data that showed the lowest 
rates of split-ticket voting were for the seats in Congress. This data suggested that 
there are differences between vertical and horizontal split-ticket voting. For 
example, levels of split-ticket voting are higher between president and governor 
(10.3 percent) than between senators and federal deputies (7.4 percent). This 
conclusion on differences across horizontal and vertical split-ticket voting was 
similar to what the analysis with aggregate data showed. 
Table 6. Ticket splitting voting in the 2012 election 
Senators vs Federal Deputies 7.4% 
President vs Governor 10.3% 
Source: 2012 Mexico Panel Data 
The 2012 Mexico Panel Study Data also shows that among the three largest 
parties (see Table 7), the PRD is the party with more vote-splitters. In terms of 
specific races, it appears that split-ticket voting levels are smallest when 
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comparing deputy and senator races. This finding adds to the argument that 
horizontal split-ticket voting is less prevalent than vertical split-ticket voting. It is 
also important to notice that split-ticket voting for small parties is the norm. This 
makes sense, considering that many of these parties did not run a presidential or 
gubernatorial candidate, which explains why there is a 100 percent split vote when 
looking at the presidential or gubernatorial elections for small parties. 
Table 7. Ballot splitting in federal and local elections (2012) 
 
President - Deputy Deputy - Senator 
President - 
Governor 
Straight Split Straight Split Straight Split 
PAN 91% 9% 93% 7% 86% 14% 
PRI 89% 11% 94% 6% 87% 13% 
PRD 79% 21% 89% 11% 86% 14% 
Others 7% 93% 53% 47% 0% 100% 
TOTAL 85% 15% 90% 10% 86% 14% 
Number of Observations: President- Deputy: 843; Deputy- Senator: 829; President- State 
governor: 284 Source: 2012 Mexico’s Panel Survey 
Source: Own analysis and elaboration 
Comparing the ecological inference results to the 2012 Mexico Panel Study, 
it is possible to find differences in magnitude across vertical and horizontal 
splitting in all elections. However, in both analyses, vertical splitting is more 
frequent than horizontal splitting (see Table 8). 
  
  
Table 8. Results of the ecological inference and the individual data analysis 
  Deputies -  
Senator 
PR Deputies - 
MR Deputies* 
President - 
Deputies 
President – 
State 
governor* 
President – 
Municipal 
president* 
Thomsen’s 
method 
PAN 24% 4% 30% - 37% 
PRI 25% 4% 31% - 41% 
PRD 9% 1% 23% - 42% 
2012 Mexico 
Panel Survey 
PAN 7% - 9% 14% - 
PRI 6% - 11% 13% - 
PRD 11% - 21% 14% - 
* Not all elections were registered in the data bases, so it is not possible compare all the analyses results. 
Source: Own analysis and elaboration
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Table 8 not only shows that there were differences across vertical and horizontal 
split-ticket voting, it also suggests that the results obtained through aggregate data 
could be overestimated. This analysis shows that the percentage of split-ticket 
voting was larger when looking at aggregate results than when using surveys. 
However, in both methods, the conclusions were the same: the percentage of 
horizontal splitting was smaller than vertical splitting. Of note in Table 7 is that 
the percentage of split-ticket varied, not only in magnitude but also across parties. 
For example, the PRD’s percentage was lower that the PRI’s and PAN’s when 
using Thomsen’s method, but it was higher than the rest of the parties in the 
Mexico Panel Study. A possible explanation for these differences is that, in a 
survey, people tend to say that they have voted for the winner, which would 
increase the percentage of split-ticket voting in this case. For example, if someone 
cast a straight ticket and voted for the PRD presidential candidate, it is likely that, 
when interviewed, this person will report having voted for the winning party (not 
the PRD, because the PRD lost the presidency). This is reported in the survey as a 
split-ticket vote, explaining why the percentage of PRD split-ticket voting was 
higher in the survey than in the aggregate results.  
In summary, I found that the levels of split-ticket voting in Mexico lie in the 
middle of the spectrum when compared to other countries. When considering a 
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strict approach to split-ticket voting and counting the percentage of voters who 
split their vote in at least one electoral race (in the 2012 elections, voters received a 
separate ballot for each of the four races), the proportion of split-ticket votes 
reached up to 25 percent. However, the rates of split-ticket voting can vary when 
we compare specific races. For example, there was a 14.8 percent difference 
between split-tickets in presidential and congressional races and only a 9.8 percent 
difference between presidential and gubernatorial races, which suggests that 
vertical splitting is more frequent than horizontal splitting. The analysis using 
aggregate data shows that the Democratic Revolutionary Party (Partido de la 
Revolución Democrática, PRD) was the party that was most affected by split-ticket 
voting: in 67 percent of the municipalities with concurrent elections, the PRD 
presidential candidate received more votes than the PRD mayoral candidate.  
Thomsen’s method for ecological inference (1987) was used to analyze 
aggregate data and estimate the percentage of voting transferred from one party 
to another. In this regard, I found that Josefina Vazquez Mota, the PAN 
presidential candidate in 2012, lost 28 percent of her votes to the PRI deputies 
(representatives from the lower house of Mexico’s Congress). Split-ticket voting 
between the PAN (right) and the PRI (center) was common, while it was less so 
between the PAN and the PRD (left). While this could suggest that ideology 
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influences the levels of split-ticket voting, I did not find evidence of this in 
individual level data. 
Analysis of Explanatory Variables 
While the aggregate and individual analysis shows the magnitude of the 
phenomenon, it does not explain the motivation for splitting ballots. The existing 
literature offers multiple hypotheses as to why this phenomenon takes place. In 
the following section, I have tested three explanations based on people’s 
motivations to vote for different parties in an election. 
The question of why people choose one party over another has long vexed 
researchers. Some have argued that there are certain factors that influence people’s 
voting decision. Yet, the question remains: Why would voters choose candidates 
from different parties? As reviewed in the first part of this paper, there are multiple 
hypotheses to explain split-ticket voting. This section presents three of those 
explanations that I have tested using logistic regressions where the dependent 
variable takes the value of 1 or 0 depending on whether the individual stated to 
have voted for different parties or not (across all four ballots: president, governor, 
senator, and federal deputies). In this model, vote splitting was dichotomized as 
“0” for a straight party vote for all four positions and “1” for any form of split-
ticket voting. Using this classification, there were 690 observations of straight 
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party voting and 177 of split-ticket voting. I began this analysis by running 
separate regressions to test each theory and then combining them to confirm the 
strength of the findings. I have analyzed vertical and horizontal split-ticket voting 
later on in this paper. 
The three main hypotheses found in the literature that explain individual 
factors that motivate split-ticket voting are: 
Hypothesis 1 (Policy Balancing): The policy balancing theory has its origins 
in the work of Alesina and Rosenthal (1989), who argued that moderate voters are 
looking for a middle ground policy and that they can obtain this by choosing 
candidates from parties with opposing ideologies. The idea behind this is that, 
under a divided government, the president and the congress will have to negotiate 
a policy that rests in the middle of their ideological positions. This theoretical 
framework is based on the U.S. model, where two major parties with different 
views compete. While there is evidence that supports the policy balancing theory 
in a bipartisan system where parties’ policy stances are divergent, this theory 
might be more difficult to prove in the case of Mexico. In a bipartisan system, 
moderate voters are the ones who split their tickets. Since Mexico has three major 
parties, moderate voters might find themselves lost in a context of multiple policy 
platforms, which might not be that clearly differentiated from each other. For 
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example, in 2012, both the PRD and the PAN offered similar goals on economic 
growth (the PRD candidate promised 6 percent growth and the PAN candidate, a 
5 percent increase) despite the fact that they are on opposite sides of the political 
spectrum. The same often occurs with topics such as education, where most parties 
propose to increase government expenditure. To operationalize this hypothesis in 
the model, I have used people’s responses about their self-placement on the 
political spectrum; I expected that those who self-reported themselves as 
moderates would split their vote more than others. This variable had three values: 
“0” for individuals who placed themselves in the center, center-left, or center-right 
of the political spectrum; “1” for individuals who identified themselves on the 
right or left of the spectrum; and “2” for individuals on the far right or far left. 
Hypothesis 2 (Candidate-Centered): In addition to the effect of factors 
surrounding parties’ policy platforms, the occurrence of split-ticket voting can also 
be influenced by candidate traits. If a certain party has a candidate who is more 
attractive to voters than the party in and of itself, it is possible that this candidate 
will draw voters from other parties. Campbell and Miller denominate this the 
“conflicting motives” argument (1957) and describe it as when “conflicted 
motivation reduces the pressure toward a party-oriented vote and opens the way 
to a divided ballot” (p. 311). In Mexico’s case, the 2012 presidential election was 
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the first time that a woman was a candidate for a major party; the PAN nominated 
Josefina Vázquez Mota. As a consequence, it is possible that some people voted 
for the PAN candidate based solely on her gender. At the same time, the PRI 
candidate was portrayed by the media as a young and handsome statesman (Serra, 
2013), factors that could be attractive to female voters. To test this hypothesis, I 
measured the difference between the evaluation of the most-favored candidate 
and the evaluation of that candidate’s party. 
Hypothesis 3: Parties are the labels that voters follow to cast their votes, 
and, therefore, the stronger voters identify with a party, the less likely they are to 
vote for another party. “A straight ticket is, after all, a straight party ticket, not a 
candidate ticket or an issue ticket” (Campbell and Miller, 1957:305). Party 
identification has also proven to be one of the most stable political attitudes in 
Mexicans’ voting behavior (Moreno, 2003). To test this hypothesis, I looked at 
voters’ self-positioning as strong, weak or lean partisans. I expect that those who 
consider themselves strongly aligned with a party will split their ballot less 
frequently if any.  
These three hypotheses were tested using data from the 2012 Mexico Panel. 
The dependent variable was assigned a “0” or “1” value depending on whether 
the voter split their ticket or not. I used socioeconomic variables, including age, 
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gender, and education, as independent variables. I ran the three models on 
different types of elections to test each model independently. This allowed me to 
not only test for multiple explanations of why people split their vote, but also to 
see if these factors vary depending on the type of election (either vertical or 
horizontal). To test hypothesis 1 (policy balancing), I used the variable of ideology, 
where it was expected that moderates would have an increased probability of 
vote-splitting. Moderates were assigned a value of “0,” while people who placed 
themselves on the right or left of the scale were assigned “1,” and those on the far-
left or far-right were assigned “2.” In the case of the candidate-centered 
hypothesis, this variable measures the difference between the evaluation of the 
most-favored candidate and the evaluation of that candidate’s party. This 
variables minimum is -7 and its maximum is 10, with a mean of 0.80. For the third 
hypothesis, the variables used to test the hypothesis of the strength of party 
identification was on a scale of “0” to “3,” depending on voters’ self-identification 
on the scale of party strength. For example, this variable was assigned the value of 
“3” when voters classified themselves as “strongly PRI partisan,” a “2” when they 
declared themselves “weak PRI partisans” and a “1” when they “leaned PRI.” 
When voters declared themselves to be nonpartisan, the value of the variable was 
“0”. 
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I tested the three different hypotheses that explain split-ticket voting with 
a logit regression statistical model (see results on Table 9 below). To begin, I tested 
each hypothesis separately, and then I tested them together. In this exercise, I took 
a rather strict approach to the definition of split-ticket voting because the 
dependent variable took all election races into account, meaning that the analysis 
included all four different ballots that were available to voters on Election Day.  
In this table, it is possible to see that hypothesis 1 (policy balancing) was the 
only one that did not achieve statistical significance. This could either be explained 
by voters’ lack of information on the meaning of left and right policies or parties’ 
failure to differentiate from each other on this scale. Additionally, the 
operationalization of this hypothesis might not reflect the true nature of 
moderates, as the Mexico Panel Study only asks voters to place themselves on the 
scale and not within parties. 
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Table 9. Split-ticket voting for all election races (President, Deputies, Senators, 
State governor)4 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Policy 
Balancing 
Candidate 
centered 
Party ID All 
     
Moderates -0.0769   0.172 
 (0.135)   (0.148) 
Interest in politics -0.00968 -0.120 -0.0199 -0.00174 
 (0.125) (0.108) (0.110) (0.130) 
Attention to media -0.0963 -0.0637 -0.0238 -0.0424 
 (0.0948) (0.0804) (0.0819) (0.0981) 
Age -0.00766 -0.00600 -0.00414 -0.00440 
 (0.00763) (0.00648) (0.00657) (0.00786) 
Gender -0.368* -0.544*** -0.490*** -0.329 
 (0.217) (0.182) (0.184) (0.224) 
Education 0.272*** 0.272*** 0.249*** 0.226** 
 (0.0970) (0.0830) (0.0837) (0.0994) 
Socioeconomic 
status 
-0.0812 -0.0944 -0.115 -0.0706 
 (0.133) (0.112) (0.114) (0.139) 
Candidate traits  0.143***  0.118** 
  (0.0404)  (0.0506) 
Partisanship   -0.480*** -0.532*** 
   (0.0858) (0.117) 
Constant -1.062 -0.885 -0.203 -0.459 
 (0.803) (0.667) (0.679) (0.836) 
     
Observations 553 808 808 550 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own analysis and elaboration 
 
4 Variation in the number of observations is related to missing values. 
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The analysis of the control variables showed that gender and education 
mattered. As the number of school years increased, so did the likelihood of split-
ticket voting. This suggests that the phenomenon of ticket-splitting could be a sign 
of voters’ political sophistication. There were decreased probabilities of split-ticket 
voting among female voters when compared to male voters, but the statistical 
significance of this was lost when all the hypotheses were combined into a single 
model. Further research is needed to address these differences across gender. 
The analysis also revealed that a candidate’s appeal and the strength of 
party identification are hypothesis that independently explain the levels of split-
ticket voting in Mexico. Moreover, they remain statistically significant in a single 
model (4), showing that split-ticket voting in Mexico responds to several 
motivations found in other countries’ literature. 
When comparing Mexico’s case to other countries, it is interesting that the 
hypothesis of policy balancing, which has seemed to hold in the United States’ 
bipartisan system, did not have an impact in Mexico. In Table 9, this variable 
(being moderate) was not statistically significant and also changed signs from 
model (1) to model (4). As mentioned above, this might be related to differences 
across party systems (two party versus multiparty systems) or to the 
operationalization of the variable. It is possible that PRI partisans assumed that 
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this party was in the center of the political spectrum, and that, therefore, they were 
ideologically moderate, which is different from being politically moderate. 34 
percent of those who identified themselves as moderates voted for the PRI 
presidential candidate. While this result suggests similarities to what has been 
found in research on Brazil (see Ames et al, 2008), more research on institutional 
variables is needed to confirm that policy is not relevant to voters when deciding 
to cast a split-ticket vote in multiparty systems. 
Another perspective that has been laid out in this paper is on the differences 
between vertical and horizontal split-ticket in Mexico. The results of the ecological 
model and the Mexico Panel Study also require deeper analysis. In the descriptive 
analysis, I found that vertical split-ticket voting occurs more frequently than 
horizontal split-ticket voting. By running the same logit model in the races for 
president-governor, president-deputies, and senators-deputies (Table 10), I found 
that party identification was the only variable that could explain vertical and 
horizontal split-ticket voting. In contrast, other variables were relevant for 
explaining vertical split-ticket voting, such as a candidate’s traits in the 
presidential-deputies comparison. It was not possible to test the variable of 
candidate traits on the congressional ballots, as the survey only asked about 
presidential candidates; further research could expand upon this. Likewise, it was 
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evident that the policy balancing theory also lacked support in this analysis, which 
compared certain electoral races. Finally, control variables such as education and 
gender were not statistically significant across all the models. 
By contrasting the results of this analysis with previous studies in Mexico, 
I found that the strength of party identification was still a relevant motivation for 
Mexicans when deciding to split their ballots. This is in line with Crow’s (2005) 
results. My analysis also showed that education levels can play a significant role 
in people’s decision to split their vote: as one’s years of education increased, so did 
the likelihood that this person would cast a vote for different parties. While this 
differs from Crow’s conclusions, it is aligned with Laborde’s work (2012), which 
also found that education levels are correlated with split-ticket voting rates in 
Mexico. In addition to the conclusions of these researchers, candidates’ traits are 
also relevant in the Mexican context. Favorable traits of candidates result in a split 
ticket, which is what has been found in other countries, such in Brazil (Ames, et al. 
2008) or Chile (Navia and Saldaña, 2015). 
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Table 10. Vertical vs Horizontal split-ticket voting (President, Deputies, 
Senators, State Governors) 
 Vertical Horizontal 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Pre-Gob Pre-Dip Sen-Dip 
Partisanship -0.453* -0.624*** -0.428*** 
 (0.261) (0.149) (0.141) 
Moderates 0.0262 0.170 0.00347 
 (0.376) (0.200) (0.196) 
 (0.0766) (0.0402) (0.0463) 
Candidate traits 0.132 0.183*** -0.00944 
 (0.109) (0.0596) (0.0694) 
Interest in politics 0.233 -0.122 0.0139 
 (0.314) (0.173) (0.169) 
Attention to media -0.0968 0.0411 -0.0117 
 (0.240) (0.132) (0.127) 
Age -0.0200 0.00892 -0.0175 
 (0.0215) (0.00995) (0.0111) 
Sex -0.110 -0.362 -0.266 
 (0.604) (0.301) (0.289) 
Education 0.0235 0.211 0.0768 
 (0.250) (0.130) (0.130) 
Socioeconomic status 0.0316 0.0904 -0.0322 
 (0.379) (0.191) (0.176) 
Constant -1.283 -1.888* -0.539 
 (2.032) (1.089) (1.109) 
    
Observations 180 516 584 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own analysis and elaboration 
Summarizing the analytical results, I tested three hypotheses found in the 
prevailing literature that operationalize citizens’ motivation to split their vote. I 
ran a multivariate statistical analysis on the 2012 Mexico Panel Study data, finding 
49 
 
evidence to support two of the three hypotheses. Surprisingly, the policy 
balancing hypothesis that emerged in the United States electoral context was not 
supported by the data. This finding might suggest that electoral institutions, 
beyond individual motivations, also play an important role in the level of split-
ticket voting. 
Conclusions 
This paper explores the phenomenon of split-ticket voting in Mexico as well 
as its magnitude and origins. While there is available literature on this topic about 
other countries, in Mexico, there are few papers that discuss this issue. With the 
availability of new methodology and data, it is now possible to test the individual 
factors that influence split-ticket voting with more accuracy. In this context, this 
paper answers several questions: How common is split-ticket voting in Mexico? 
Are there differences in the rates of horizontal and vertical split-ticket voting? 
And, what individual factors account for split-ticket voting in Mexico? 
To measure the magnitude of split-ticket voting, I used both individual and 
aggregate level data for the 2012 federal and state elections. Using Thomsen’s 
method, I found that the levels of split-ticket voting varied depending on the type 
of election (horizontal or vertical) and the party. In particular, when selecting 
candidates for positions that might appear similar (as in the case of PR and MR 
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deputies) only 10 percent of voters split their ballots. The opposite occurred in 
vertical elections (presidential versus municipal), where up to 67 percent of voters 
split their vote, especially among those who selected the PRD candidate for the 
presidency and any other party for municipal elections. 
The methodology used also allowed for the identification of differences in 
split-ticket voting levels based on party identification. This study found high rates 
of vote transfers between PRI and PAN voters, which means that it would be likely 
for PAN voters to split their votes in favor of a PRI candidate, and the other way 
around. I also found that PRD voters would rather choose a PRI candidate than a 
PAN candidate. Although these results suggested that Mexican voters were driven 
by ideology (a PRD left-wing voter would almost never vote for a PAN right-wing 
candidate), the analysis on voters’ motivations to split their ballot showed that 
ideology was not a relevant factor. Ideology plays a relevant role in voters’ 
decisions in countries with two parties occupying opposite sides of the policy 
agenda—as in the United States—; however, under a multiparty system—as in 
Mexico—, moderate voters might find it more difficult to choose a middle ground 
position. 
This paper has presented an exploration of Mexican voters’ motivations to 
split their ballots using the Mexico 2012 Panel Study. This survey asked Mexicans 
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about their voting decision after Election Day and combined results with other 
socioeconomic and political information. This is not only the most recent panel 
survey in Mexico, but it also studies one of the least controversial presidential 
elections in recent history (in contrast to 2000 when the PAN won for the first time 
in 71 years). While other studies of split-ticket voting used data from Mexico’s 2000 
or 2006 presidential elections, using the Mexico 2012 Panel Study allowed me to 
corroborate other researchers’ findings while also testing new hypotheses on the 
differences between horizontal and vertical split-ticket voting. 
The results of the logit model showed support for two of the three 
hypotheses that were tested: party identification and candidate traits. This 
evidence holds for each hypothesis when tested independently and when united 
into a single model. Policy balancing was the only one that was not statistically 
significant, suggesting that it lacks relevance in the Mexican context. However, it 
could be argued that the operationalization of that variable could have led to this 
result. 
Finally, this paper has gone beyond previous analyses on split-ticket voting 
in Mexico by exploring the differences between vertical and horizontal split-ticket 
voting. I found evidence that vertical split-ticket voting rates were larger than 
horizontal split-ticket voting in Mexico. People split their ballot more frequently 
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when voting for different levels of government. This might indicate that people 
differentiated between what they were looking for in a president versus in a mayor 
and were more willing to look past the fact that they were from different parties. 
However, this hypothesis was based on the assumption that people had enough 
information about both parties and were also aware of the differences, and that 
this enabled them to choose candidates from different parties. To a certain extent, 
this could be supported by the fact that education appeared to be a significant 
factor for those who were more likely to split their vote. However, more research 
is needed to confirm this conjecture. 
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CHAPTER TWO - SPLIT-TICKET VOTING: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
OF INSTITUTIONS ACROSS 13 COUNTRIES 
Abstract 
Literature on split-ticket voting has focused on case studies, emphasizing the 
relevance of individual factors but leaving the role of institutions out. This paper 
aims to give proper credit to institutions as relevant influencers of political 
decisions. To do this, I identified the institutional variables from case studies on 
split-ticket voting and measured their effect on peoples’ voting decisions. This 
paper is a cross-national study of 13 countries with ample variance on the type of 
electoral institutions. I used The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Module 
3 dataset to test the effect of institutional variables like political alliances, type of 
electoral formula, number, and magnitude of electoral districts, 
institutionalization of democracy, and type of executive. Using a multilevel logit  
model, I found evidence that institutions play a relevant role in influencing 
individuals’ decision to split their ballot. To complement the econometric analysis, 
I conducted a ballot experiment to measure how the number of political parties on 
a ballot affect the level of split-ticket voting. Results showed that increasing the 
number of parties on a ballot increases the probability of a split-ticket vote. 
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Introduction 
The study of split-ticket voting surged in American literature as an 
explanation for the divided government phenomenon (Campbell and Miller, 1957; 
McAllister and Darcy, 1992; Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995). Research papers and 
books were written explaining American voters’ reasons for choosing different 
parties on Election Day. Building off this trend, researchers shifted their attention 
to this phenomenon in other countries, for example, Ames et al. (2008) in Brazil, 
Arian and Weiss (1969) in Israel, Barry (2009) in Japan, and Gschwend (2007) in 
Germany. In their respective countries, researchers found relevant factors that 
contributed to the explanation of the split-ticket phenomenon. Institutional 
variables appear as an important part of that explanation.  
While the study of a single country allows for a deep understanding of 
ticket splitting, it is not possible to control for different features of the electoral 
system, such as the number of parties or the electoral rules. For example, Ames et 
al. (2008) suggest that the high number of parties in Brazil’s characteristic, open-
list, proportional representation system may explain why almost 70 percent of the 
ballots are split. This raises the question of whether this finding holds for other 
countries with similar electoral systems and if other institutional factors affect 
existing levels of ticket splitting. 
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Recent comparative research on ticket-splitting in different countries has 
focused on similar electoral systems. For example, Johnston and Pattie (2002) look 
at ticket-splitting in New Zealand, Scotland, and Wales, countries that have a 
Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system. In a similar fashion, Moser 
and Scheiner (2005) analyze ticket-splitting in five countries with an MMP 
electoral system. In both cases, researchers found that under similar electoral 
systems, personal reasons guided ticket-splitters’ voting decision. In this type of 
research, institutional variance is needed to better understand the ticket-splitting 
phenomenon. 
Both case studies and comparative studies on split-ticket voting show that 
institutions play a relevant role in determining people’s voting behavior. Electoral 
rules—such as those determining the type of executive and legislative ballots, the 
formula for translating seats into votes, the size and number of electoral districts, 
and the timing and frequency of presidential, legislative, and local elections—
shape voters’ available options (Duverger 1954; Lijphart 1994; Rae 1971; Taagepera 
1989). In terms of the number of parties in a ballot, researchers have found that a 
high number of candidates/parties can lead to high levels of split-ticket voting, as 
in the case of Brazil. In Brazil the proportional system combines with a high district 
magnitude since each district may have between 8 to 70 congressional 
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representatives, and the number of candidates running for these seats can be as 
high as 700 (Ames et. al., 2008). According to these authors, these characteristics 
can account for the nearly 70% of split-ticket voting in the country. Also, in the 
United States, Rusk (1970) argued that third parties broaden the alternatives open 
to the voter and in this way contribute to split ticket voting in certain areas (p. 
1224). 
This paper reports the results of a study on the effect that institutional 
variables have on voters’ decisions to split their tickets. I used mixed methods, 
including a cross-national quantitative analysis plus an experimental study to test 
how the number of parties on a ballot affects ticket splitting. The countries 
analyzed for the cross-national study showed that levels of ticket-splitting vary 
from country to country. Data from the CSES Module 3 showed split-ticket 
percentages varying from a low of 15 percent in Thailand up to a high of 79 percent 
in Japan. This study quantifies the effect that certain institutional variables—such 
as presidential and parliamentary executives, different sizes and numbers of 
electoral districts, and different types of electoral systems—have on split-ticket 
voting. 
I supplemented this analysis with an experiment: I tested three electoral 
ballots with a different number of party logos to determine whether those 
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differences induced voters to split their tickets. This method adds internal validity 
to the existing literature on the effects of institutional variables on levels of split-
ticket voting. For the experiment, I recruited volunteer students from six 
universities in Mexico City to participate; some of these universities were public 
and others were private. I analyzed the information from the 395 surveys that were 
collected to measure the effect of shifting the number of parties on a ballot on split-
ticket voting. 
The first section of the paper identifies institutional variables in the 
available literature on split-ticket voting. The second section discuses each 
institutional variable and its expected effects on split-ticket voting. The third 
section explores the effects of institutional variables with a cross-national dataset. 
The fourth section describes an experiment with different number of parties in a 
ballot. The final section discusses the main results and suggests a future research 
agenda. 
Case and Cross-National Based Studies, Identified Institutional Variables  
The line of research of split-ticket voting began in the United States as a 
result of the rise of divided government during the 1950s and 1960s; it then gained 
greater strength with the surge of case studies in new democracies. Recently, the 
availability of individual level data and new methodologies to infer voting choices 
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from aggregate electoral data has also contributed to expanding the research on 
split-ticket voting. As a result, there are multiple studies done in different 
countries and a few cross-national studies that discuss how institutions influence 
the levels of split-ticket voting. 
Studies on the influence that institutional variables have on split-ticket 
voting in the United States have typically focused on the electoral system. Yet, in 
addition to differences inherent in the government structure itself, other 
researchers focus on the design of the physical ballot and how this design can 
shape levels of split-ticket voting. In this line of research, Campbell and Miller 
(1957) find that the differences in ballot design found across different states were 
influential in the levels of ticket splitting. These authors describe how states with 
a single ballot for all electoral races tend to have higher straight-ticket voting levels 
than states with multiple ballots. McAllister and Darcy’s (1992) study of the 1988 
elections in the U.S. also supports Campbell and Miller, finding that differences in 
ballot design across states account for ticket-splitting levels. Most recently, Roberts 
(2009) finds evidence that ballot design is relevant during Senate elections. 
Another electoral institution that affects levels of split-ticket voting is the existence 
of staggered elections. According to Shugart (1995), the existence of staggered 
elections increases the chance of split-ticket voting. The president’s party’s share 
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of seats tends to increase in early-term elections but decline in later elections 
(Shugart, 1995). A similar suggestion is made by Erikson (1988), who argues that 
votes against the president’s party in off-year House elections are intended to 
moderate the president’s initiatives. 
The two-party system also plays a relevant role in the levels of split-ticket 
voting in the United States. Burden and Kimball (2002) argue that split-ticket 
voting in this country can be explained by the existence of uneven campaigns and 
the blurring of party differences. However, Lewis-Beck and Nadeau’s (2004) book 
suggests that the two-party system triggers a Madisonian motivation in voters, 
meaning that voters try to balance power by dividing their vote. 
Case studies have also included other advanced democracies in addition to 
the United States. As Germany is a classic example of a mixed electoral system, 
studies focused on this country have become especially popular. For example, 
Gschwend’s (2007) research in Germany argues that, under a mixed electoral 
system, voters are strategic and do not automatically cast their vote for larger 
parties. According to this author, coalition matters. Also focusing on Germany, 
Gschwend and Pattie (2003) argue that party strength plays a relevant role in 
motivating voters to cast a straight ticket. A similar finding is argued by Bawn 
(1999), who claims that voters are strategic and vote for the strongest candidates, 
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be they incumbents, from the party most expected to be in the government, or from 
parties demonstrating other signs of party strength. Pappi and Thurner (2002) also 
posit that party rankings and coalition preferences are the main explanations for 
levels of split-ticket voting in Germany. 
Continuing in the line of research of case studies of countries with mixed-
electoral systems, Benoit, Giannetti, and Laver (2005) explored the 1996 mixed-
member election of Italy’s Chamber of Deputies. According to these authors, split-
ticket voting is motivated by frustrated voters who cannot find their preferred 
party on both lists (candidate and party lists). A similar phenomenon occurs in the 
case of Japan, where not all parties have candidates competing on all ballots, which 
increases the levels of split-ticket voting (Burden, 2009). Finally, a similar 
hypothesis is tested by Karp et al. (2002) in the New Zealand context. These 
authors find that that strategic defections are more likely to occur when the 
preferred candidate is not viable. While these studies focused on the particular 
settings of the parties and voters within the country of study, they also shed light 
on the particularities of the mixed-electoral systems and voters’ motivation to split 
their ballots. 
On a different line of research, there are case studies based on new 
democracies such as Mexico, Argentina, or Brazil. Existing literature on these 
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countries have linked ticket-splitting levels to different factors. For example, 
Burden and Helmke (2009) argue that in Mexico—a country that used to be a single 
party autocracy—voters split their ballots as an electoral insurance policy to 
protect themselves from new and unknown political opposition. Calvo et al. (2008) 
remarked that the introduction of electronic ballots allowed for an experiment in 
ballot design, finding that, “ballots that highlight candidate-centric information 
induced higher split-ticket rates than ballots reinforcing party-centric 
information” (p.220). Finally, Ames et al.’s (2008) study on split-ticket voting in 
Brazil finds evidence that an electoral system of proportional representations in a 
context of low, political voting sophistication and weak parties leads to high levels 
of ticket splitting. Even when these case studies focus on different institutional 
elements to explain the phenomenon of ticket splitting, in all cases, a weak 
institutional system can be accountable for voters’ decisions to split their tickets. 
In recent years, existing literature on split-ticket voting based on case 
studies has been complemented with cross-national studies. For example, Elkit 
and Kjaer (2005) explore how institutional characteristics and voter characteristics 
in Denmark, Sweden, and England affect levels of split-ticket voting. However, 
these researchers did not find concluding evidence that institutions were entirely 
responsible for higher levels of split-ticket voting in Denmark. Kostadinova (2006) 
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studied countries where proportional representation and plurality formulas are 
combined, specifically Croatia, Lithuania, and Ukraine. This author found that 
supporters of weaker parties, like voters in consolidated democracies, split their 
votes when faced with strategic situations. Moser and Scheiner (2009) examined 
strategic voting in mixed-member electoral systems in ten countries and in a total 
of 35 elections, finding that strategic voting is a characteristic of established 
democracies. 
While the literature in case and cross-national studies has focused on split-
ticket voting, limited evidence has been found on how institutional settings affect 
the levels of split-ticket voting. Moreover, most of the cross-national studies are 
based on countries with similar institutional electoral systems, which reduces 
variance in the sample and therefore the explanatory power of institutional 
variables. In this context, this paper aims to contribute to the literature by adding 
evidence on institutional factors in different countries. 
Comparing Across Institutional Variables 
Previously-published literature reports a high level of variance in the levels 
of split-ticket voting in countries with different institutional arrangements. For 
example, Johnston and Pattie (2002, 586–587) found that 37 percent of tickets were 
split in the 1996 New Zealand election, a country with a mixed-electoral system. 
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In Germany, also a mixed electoral system, the number of ticket splitters was 
around 23 percent in 2002 (Pappi and Gschwend, 2005). In Brazil, a country with 
a proportional electoral system, the level of split-ticket voting was 70 percent in 
the 2002 election. In the U.S., a majoritarian system, the percentage of electorate 
voting for different parties varies between 10 percent and 25 percent (Burden and 
Kimball, 2002). What might account for these differences across countries? The 
literature suggests that different institutional settings can affect the levels of split-
ticket voting. In this section, I identify these institutions and summarize the 
evidence on the institutional mechanisms that lead to split-ticket voting. 
1. Majority, proportional, and mixed electoral systems 
While there are no published studies that directly compare countries head-
to-head, certain components of different political systems—such as the number of 
parties and party alliances—have been studied and have been found to influence 
ticket-splitting levels. In a majority electoral system, as in the U.S., the levels of 
ticket-splitting have maintained stable between 10 percent to 25 percent. Brazil, a 
country with a proportional system and 8.5 effective parties, sees rates up to 70 
percent (Ames et. al., 2008). Likewise, Germany, with a mixed electoral system, 
sees rates around 22 percent (Pappi and Thurner, 2002). A possible explanation for 
this difference might lie in voters’ decision-making processes.  
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First, research shows that split-ticket levels are low in a majority electoral 
system, such as the United States, in comparison with other systems (Burden and 
Kimball, 2002). In the context of a two-party system, two main explanations for 
split-ticket voting have emerged: that ticket-splitting is the result of lack of sharp 
differences across parties (Burden and Kimball, 2002) or that voters are strategic 
and want a balanced policy agenda (Fiorina, 1994; Lewis-Beck and Nadeau, 2004). 
Second, in a proportional system, there are incentives for an elevated 
number of parties and candidates. Duverger’s law indicates that the proportional 
system leads to a large number of parties. In Brazil the proportional system 
combines with a high district magnitude since each district may have between 8 
to 70 congressional representatives, and the number of candidates running for 
these seats can be as high as 700 (Ames et. al., 2008). This context demands high 
cognitive skills from voters (Calvo et.al. 2008). When facing multiple options, the 
amount of information that voters must process to choose their preferred 
candidates or parties is higher, and the need for cues also increases (Reynolds and 
Steenbergen, 2006). As a consequence, the likelihood of voters splitting their ballot 
is high.5  
 
5Additional factors influence Brazil’s case and are discussed in the paragraph on new versus 
established democracies. 
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Third, the chances of voters splitting their votes are higher in a mixed 
electoral system, as each voter can receive two ballots, one for the majority 
candidate and another for the party list candidate. This type of system can be 
highly complex due to the different rules that convert a party list vote into a seat. 
While this set of rules might seem impossible for voters to understand, different 
studies on this type of system show that voters are using their votes strategically 
(Kostadinova, 2006; Gschwend, 2007). In this context, electoral alliances become 
important for voters’ decisions. 
2. Parliamentary systems vs. presidential systems 
Bean and Wattenberg’s research (1998) studies the ticket-splitting 
phenomenon in two countries: the United States with a presidential system and 
Australia with a parliamentary system. These authors argue that the 
parliamentary system in Australia6  (by favoring strategic voting towards smaller 
parties to form a government) promotes strategic voting, which, in conjunction 
with strong party labels, results in higher levels of ticket-splitting than in the 
United States. Studies of other parliamentary systems, such as Germany, also 
 
6 These authors compare the splitting vote in the House and Senate elections in Australia as a 
parliamentary system. 
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suggest that voters make use of sophisticated balloting, splitting their votes 
between viable candidates from large parties and candidates from small parties 
that are closer to their true preferences (Jesse, 1988; Herrmann and Urban, 2008). 
According to these authors, voters also consider possible parliamentary coalitions 
when splitting their ballots.  
3. New versus established democracies 
Existing research suggests that the levels of institutionalization are relevant 
for voters at the time of making a decision about whether to split their ballots or 
not. Due to weak label parties that might lead to candidate-centered campaigns, 
the levels of split-ticket voting in new democracies are expected to be higher than 
in established democracies where party loyalty might be ingrained in voters. In 
Mexico’s case, Burden and Helkme (2009) argue that split-ticket voting reflects the 
existing political uncertainty. These authors suggest that under a context of a new 
political opposition in a hegemonic regime, voters would split their ballots as an 
electoral insurance. Something similar occurs in Brazil; Ames et. al., (2008, p. 11) 
argue that Brazil’s weak party system could explain why a straight-ticket occurs 
mostly “by accident.” In addition, Scheiner (2009) compares ten countries with 
mixed electoral systems and finds evidence that strategic voting is a characteristic 
of established democracies rather than new democracies. 
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The effects of these different political institutions on ticket-splitting levels 
are reviewed using the data available from the Comparative Study of Electoral 
Systems. This dataset includes individual level information based on post-election 
interviews obtained between 2006 and 2011.7 In addition, it contains information 
on the election during which the survey was administered, such as the type of 
election, the number of candidates, the type of executive, and the seats contended. 
An econometric model, described in the following section, was used to test the 
influence of institutional variables on the levels of ticket splitting. 
Cross-National Analysis 
The CSES gathers information on different countries’ electoral systems and 
individual level data on political behavior. This unique setting allows for a cross-
national analysis of split-ticket voting. The database includes information on 13 
countries and 16,681 observations from different electoral races. The table below 
includes a description of the selected countries and their levels of split-ticket 
voting. 
  
 
7 More information on http://www.cses.org/datacenter/module3/module3.htm 
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Table 11. Countries Analyzed by Type of Election and Percentage of Split-
Ticket Voting 
Source: Own analysis and elaboration 
According the CSES Module 3 database, Japan is the country with the 
highest levels of split-ticket voting (79 percent) and Thailand is the country with 
the lowest levels (15 percent). These levels are calculated by looking at the voting 
choices of each respondent for each race. These levels are sometimes in line with 
previously-reported research and sometimes divergent. For example, Burden 
 
8 Japan has a mixed electoral system which allows for split-ticket voting when choosing a PR and 
a MR member of the House of Councilors (upper house) 
9 In this case, split-ticket voting is measured as the voter’s choice for the President as point of 
reference. 
Country 
Election 
year 
Type of election Percentage of 
split-ticket 
voting 
President 
Lower 
House 
Upper 
House 
Japan8 2007   X 79% 
Brazil 2010 X X  71% 
Chile 2009 X X  70% 
Switzerland 2007  X X 57% 
Peru 2011 X X  32% 
United States 2008 X X X 32%9 
Estonia 2011  X  31% 
Germany 2009  X  29% 
New Zealand 2008  X  27% 
South Korea 2008  X  27% 
Australia 2007  X X 21% 
Poland 2007  X X 19% 
Thailand 2007  X  15% 
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(2009) used ecological inference methods and found that a proportion of 50 percent 
of voters split their ballots in the Japanese 2000 election (much lower than the 79 
percent reported in the CSES Module 3). In contrast, Brazil’s levels of split-ticket 
voting are almost identical to those estimated by Ames et. al.’s (2008) for the 2002 
national elections (71 percent vs. 70 percent).  
The differences between split-ticket levels described in this paper and levels 
in the literature can be explained by two factors. First, split-ticket levels can vary 
from one election to another and from one electoral race to another. Table 2 shows 
that, for example, the database includes Japan’s upper house election in 2007 but 
Burden’s (2009) study estimates the split-ticket levels for the lower house in 2000. 
This also occurs with other studies reviewed in the literature. Second, it is 
important to mention that the calculations of the split-ticket voting levels in the 
graph above are performed entirely based on individual data from post-electoral 
surveys. This type of survey can suffer from bias, especially from people 
misreporting their voting decisions in a direction that is more socially desirable 
(Belli et al., 1999; Presser, 1990). 
Each country in the database has its own electoral and political institutions. 
Appendix 2 briefly describes each country’s institutions and the electoral data 
available in the CSES Module 3. I added an additional category describing each 
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country’s years of democracy. I used the data provided by Boix-Miller-Rosato 
Dichotomous Coding of Democracy.  
To test the effect of institutional variables over the levels of split-ticket 
voting I used a multilevel model for binary responses. This model is a good fit to 
analyze the data, since our dependent variable takes the value of 0 if the voter cast 
a straight ticket and a value of 1 in the case of a divided vote. The data have a two-
level hierarchical structure with 16, 681 respondents at level 1, nested within 13 
countries at level 2. I divided the independent variables into individual (level 1) 
and institutional (level 2) factors. For individual variables,10 I included gender, 
level of education, socioeconomic status, a dummy variable to signal if a voter 
resided in a rural or urban area, campaign involvement, a dummy variable of the 
voter’s party identification, voter’s self-positioning on the left-right political 
continuum, the existence of a political leader who represents the voter’s views, 
and the voter’s response to a political information item. The institutional variables 
include the number of electoral districts, the average district magnitude, the 
availability of alliances, the type of electoral system, the type of executive, and 
 
10 It is important to consider that the individual level data is collected through post-election 
surveys, which might be influenced by the vote itself. A model without these variables is 
presented in Appendix 1. 
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years of democracy. All these variables were selected for their existence in 
evidence-based research, which was reviewed in previous sections.  
With this information, I began fitting a null or empty two-level model, 
which is a model with only an intercept and country effects. From the model 
estimates, we can say that the log-odds of vote-splitting in an ‘average’ country is 
estimated as -0.50. The intercept for country j is -0.50+uoj where the variance is 
estimated as 0.96. The test statistic is 3248.83 with a corresponding p-value of less 
than 0.00005 and so there is strong evidence that the between country variance is 
non-zero. 
I ran a multilevel, random intercept logistic model of split ticket voting. In 
the first model, I tested the individual level variables and in the second one, I 
included second level variables. Results are in Table 12. Model 1 and 2 show that 
the variable of education is statistically significant and with a positive sign. It has 
been argued that sophisticated voters can be more strategic about their vote and 
choose to split their vote to meet certain objectives. This result is consistent with 
the findings in Chapter 1 on individual factors that influence split-ticket voting. 
Among the individual political variables, the Nonpartisan variable has a 
positive sign and is statistically significant. This result is in line to what previous 
authors argue, positing that those who identify with a political party remain loyal 
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and cast a straight ticket. The Nonpartisan variable is coded as a dummy variable, 
separating individuals into those who said they felt identified with a party (0) and 
those who did not (1). In addition, the variable of political ideology in Model 1 
indicates that people closest to the right are less likely to split their ballot. The 
variables of political leader, political knowledge, campaign involvement and size 
of the city were not statistically significant. 
In model 2, I included second level variables (institutional variables) to see 
their impact on voters’ probability to split their ballot. The variables of the number 
of electoral districts, the average district magnitude, alliances formed, majoritarian 
and proportional electoral system, presidential democracy and years of 
democracy appear to be statistically significant. As the number of electoral 
districts increased, the probability of a voter casting a split ticket decreased. The 
opposite occurred with the average district magnitude variable. This could explain 
Brazil’s high level of split-ticket voting since that country has an unusually high 
district magnitude.  
The variable of political alliance was statistically significant but with a sign 
different of the one outlined in the literature. According to this result, the presence 
of political alliances decreases the probability of a split-ticket vote. Regarding the 
electoral systems variables, the analysis showed that proportional electoral 
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systems increased the probability of split-ticket voting while majoritarian electoral 
systems decreases it. These results are in line with the reviewed literature (Pappi 
and Thurner, 2002; Kostadinova, 2006; Gschwend, 2007; Ames et al, 2008).  
According to model 2, presidential systems increases the likelihood of split-
ticket voting. This result is not what the literature argued as in the case of 
Australia, and more research needs to be done to understand the mechanism 
behind.11 Finally of this model the variable of years of democracy increased the 
probability of a split vote, contrary to what the literature in new democracies has 
found (Burden and Helmke, 2009; and Ames et al, 2008). However, Kostadinova 
(2006) argues that strategic voting can be found in both new and established 
democracies. More research will be needed to better understand the effect of 
democratization on split-ticket voting. 
Finally, the variable for majoritarian electoral systems was statistically 
significative and in the expected direction. The interpretation of this was that 
majoritarian systems tend to inhibit voters from splitting their tickets, which is 
confirmed in the analysis. 
 
11 Important to consider that the countries with parliamentary system included in the sample 
have differentiate voting across government levels which allows for a split-ticket voting analysis.  
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Overall, the cross-national analysis in the thirteen different countries that is 
presented here showed that institutional variables play a relevant role in voters’ 
decision to cast a split vote on Election Day.  
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Table 12. Multilevel Logistic Model of Split Ticket Voting, Random Intercept 
Model 
 
 (1) (2) 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 
   
First Level   
Female -0.0235 -0.0231 
 (0.0565) (0.0565) 
Education 0.0431*** 0.0421*** 
 (0.0159) (0.0159) 
Campaign involvement 0.0492 0.0455 
 (0.0378) (0.0379) 
Political leader 0.0165 0.0167 
 (0.0737) (0.0737) 
Nonpartisan 0.264*** 0.263*** 
 (0.0709) (0.0710) 
Political knowledge -0.0695 -0.0771 
 (0.0998) (0.0996) 
Political ideology -0.0250** -0.0254** 
 (0.0115) (0.0115) 
Size of city 0.00100 0.00157 
 (0.0255) (0.0255) 
Second Level   
Log number of electoral districts  -2.894*** 
  (0.852) 
Average district magnitude  0.0664* 
  (0.0388) 
Alliances formed  -12.53*** 
  (2.457) 
Majoritarian  -7.636*** 
  (1.396) 
Proportional  7.891*** 
  (1.541) 
Mixed  - 
   
Presidential democracy  0.608*** 
  (0.137) 
Years of democracy  0.0682*** 
  (0.0119) 
Constant -1.087*** 10.18** 
 (0.368) (4.076) 
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Observations 6,820 6,820 
Number of groups 10 10 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own analysis and elaboration 
A Ballot Experiment 
As the analysis’ results in the previous section showed, in proportional 
systems the likelihood of ticket splitting is larger while majoritarian systems 
reduce the likelihood of ticket splitting. Following these results, it could be 
expected that as the number of parties increases also the options available to voters 
and therefore the possibility to split their ballot. While in the first section I already 
explored the individual level motivations for ticket splitting, an unexplored 
approach is related on how the number of parties in a ballot can influence voters’ 
decisions to split their ballots. 
In an effort to follow in these lines of research and contribute to the 
literature on institutions and voting behavior, I designed an experiment to test the 
hypothesis that the number of parties in a ballot can influence the likelihood that 
a voter will choose different parties. I was specifically interested in measuring 
whether or not the number of parties on a ballot would have an impact on the 
levels of split-ticket voting. To do this, I designed three different electoral ballots 
for every type of election. Each ballot contained a different quantity of political 
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parties (3, 7, and 10) and party logos that mimicked a real ballot but did not include 
any candidate names (see Figure 4). 
Figure 4. Original Ballot and Ballots Used for the Experiment 
Source: Instituto Nacional Eleectoral and elaboration on the basis of their sample material. 
It is important to mention that these ballots do not simply vary with respect 
to the number of parties. They also vary with respect to the ideological spread and 
the age of the parties. The ballot with 3 parties displays the oldest and largest 
political parties in Mexico. The ballot with 7 political parties adds smaller parties. 
And the ballot with 10 political parties includes the newest political parties in 
Mexico. This is particularly relevant for college students who are probably more 
likely than other voters to support newer parties. 
In this experiment, participants received ballots for three types of elections: 
one for the presidential race, one for the congressional representative race, and one 
for the local government race. That is to say, participants received three ballots to 
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vote for three different positions: president, federal deputies, and governor. 
Ballots were randomly assigned to respondents and there was no mixing of 
different quantities of parties within the same participant’s package of ballots.  
To avoid bias, each participant was previously informed of the survey 
characteristics without disclosing the true objective of the survey. In addition to 
the voting exercise, participants were also administered a questionnaire about 
their political behaviors. This questionnaire included questions related to political 
party affiliation, level of involvement in previous elections, attention to media, and 
political ideology. The participants were volunteer college students from six 
universities in Mexico City: Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, 
Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México, Tecnológico de Monterrey, 
Universidad Iberoamericana, Universidad de las Americas, and Universidad 
Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM). Students were drawn from different 
majors: economics, political science, medicine, and architecture; UNAM 
contributed students from two departments: the political science department and 
the medical school. There were no benefits attached to participating in the survey, 
and all participants were allowed to withdraw from the experiment at any time. 
The experiment took place between June and September of 2015, and a total of 418 
students participated. It is important to mention that local elections were held in 
79 
 
June 7th, which means that people casted a ballot for one of the parties in the 
experiment and in consequences they may be more anchored to that choice and 
less free to be moved by the experimental stimulus.  
The analysis of the surveys showed that respondents were younger (20.5 
years versus the national average of 30 years) and substantially more educated 
than Mexico´s population. In comparison to other variables, the respondents’ 
characteristics were relatively similar to the general Mexican population. In terms 
of political preferences, the proportion of PAN supporters was markedly higher 
than the proportion of those in the general population. This was understandable, 
as the surveys were held in an urban area. Participants’ political ideology was 
distributed fairly similarly to that of the rest of the Mexican population. See Figure 
5 through 8 below for further detail. 
Figure 5. Comparison Between Participants and the Mexican Population by 
Gender 
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Source: Own analysis and elaboration 
Figure 6. Participants and Mexican Population by Party Identification 
Source: Own analysis and elaboration 
Figure 7. Participants and Mexican Population by Political Ideology 
Source: Own analysis and elaboration 
Regarding our variable of interest, the data collected showed that 55.7 
percent of all participants split their ballots regardless of the number of parties on 
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their assigned ballots. Subgroup analysis based on participant responses to the 
questionnaire yielded interesting insights. Vote splitters reported being more 
interested in politics (39 percent of whom reported great interest) than non-
splitters (32 percent of whom reported great interest). In terms of party affiliation, 
the PAN party was the most popular, with 58 percent of ticket-splitters and 24 
percent of non-splitters reporting that they belonged to the PAN. Also, none of the 
straight-vote participants reported belonging to a smaller party, while 4 percent of 
the splitters did. In the left-right political spectrum, splitters identified themselves 
more on the left and those who cast a straight vote placed themselves more to the 
right (see Figure 9). 
Figure 8. Distribution on the Left-Right Spectrum of Participants, by Type of 
Vote 
Source: Own analysis and elaboration 
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There were no large differences between groups in terms of their approval 
ratings of the current government. However, differences were found on their 
perspective of the state economy, the national economy, and their personal 
finances. Participants who did not split their ticket were more pessimistic about 
the national economy that those who did. The opposite occurred with the opinion 
about their personal financial situations: splitters felt their finances were worse at 
the time of the study than before. Finally, regarding media attention, splitters said 
they were more attentive to news than non-splitters. This is in line with the result 
that they were more interested in politics. A table with all the results can be found 
in the Appendix 1. 
Regarding the differences across ballot types, I found that the percentage of 
splitters was higher for participants who received a ballot with ten political parties. 
However, whether or not a larger number of parties on a ballot would also increase 
the number of splitters was not clear, as there were fewer splitters in the “ballot 2” 
group than in the “ballot 1” group (see Figure 10). 
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Figure 9. Percentage of Participants by Type of Ballot 
 
Source: Own analysis and elaboration 
When examining the votes cast by ticket splitters in the experiment, in 
general, it is evident that traditional large parties lost support as the number of 
political alternatives appeared on the ballot. In particular, the PAN was the party 
that lost the most (18 percent) in comparison with other parties (PRI, 4 percent; 
PRD, 2 percent). It is also interesting that all the parties lost support from ballot 2 
(seven parties) to ballot 3 (ten parties), except for the PRD (See Figure 10) 
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Figure 10. Percentage of Participants that Split their Vote (Voter’s Choice for the 
Federal Deputies)  by Party and Type of Ballot 
Source: Own analysis and elaboration 
Descriptive statistics suggest that the increase in the number of parties in 
the ballots leads to an increase in ticket-splitting. To estimate the treatment effects, 
I conducted a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) to determine if split-ticket 
voting was statistically different for groups with different type of ballots. The 
ANOVA is used to determine whether the mean of a dependent variable is the 
same in two or more unrelated, independent groups.  
In the experiment participants were classified into three groups: Ballot 1 (n 
= 126), Ballot 2 (n = 102) and Ballot 3 (n = 76). There was a statistically significant 
difference between groups as determined by one-way ANOVA (F (2,301) = 4.44, 
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p=0.0126). A Tukey post-hoc test revealed that split-ticket voting was statistically 
significantly higher in the Ballot 3 group compared to the Ballot 1 group (0.20 ± 
0.069, p = 0.010). There are also differences between the Ballot 3 group and the 
Ballot 2 group (0.16 ± 0.072, p = 0.072). However, there were no statistically 
significant differences between the Ballot 2 and Ballot 1 groups (0.043 ± 0.063, p = 
0.775). 
Additionally, I used a probit regression to increase the precision of 
estimates by controlling for cofounders. This model is used to model dichotomous 
or binary outcome variables. For the statistical analysis, the dependent variable 
was whether or not the voter split his or her ticket, with the variable taking a value 
of “0” for a straight ticket and “1” for a split ticket. Our variable of interest is the 
number of parties on the ballot. This variable is called “type of ballot” and it takes 
three values (3, 7 and 10), corresponding to the number of political parties that 
appear on the ballot. I also included participants’ characteristics, such as gender 
and age, and control variables that have been found to be related to voting 
behavior in the literature. The control variables included party ID (Party ID), 
political ideology on the left-right spectrum (Ideology), approval of the president 
(President’s approval), retrospective evaluation of the national economy (National 
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economy), retrospective evaluation of personal finances (Pocketbook), and level of 
attention paid to the media (Media attention). 
I expected a negative sign for the variable of party ID since partisans tend 
to remain loyal to their parties and cast a straight vote. I expected a positive sign 
for the variables on retrospective voting and presidential approval, since a 
negative assessment on the performance of the president’s administration at the 
time of the interview could lead to an increase in split-ticket voting. Finally, for the 
variable of interest, I expected a positive sign, as research has shown that the 
higher the number of parties on a ballot, the higher the probability of split-ticket 
voting. Results of the analysis can be found in Table 13 below. 
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Table 13. Probit model of split-ticket voting as the dependent variable 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 
   
Ballot with 7 parties 0.120 0.177 
 (0.173) (0.192) 
Ballot with 10 parties 0.530*** 0.449** 
 (0.185) (0.207) 
Gender  -0.234 
  (0.168) 
Age  -0.0224 
  (0.0283) 
Party ID  -0.121* 
  (0.0723) 
Ideology  -0.0953** 
  (0.0405) 
President’s approval  0.0988 
  (0.0817) 
National Economy  0.141 
  (0.106) 
Pocketbook  -0.0391 
  (0.0899) 
Media attention  -0.00738 
  (0.0785) 
Constant -0.497*** 0.626 
 (0.117) (0.801) 
   
Observations 304 278 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own analysis and elaboration 
In the first model, I used as the dependent variable a dummy for Split-ticket 
voting and as independent variables the 3-party ballot as the base category and 
dummies for the 7-party and 10-party ballots. The model shows treatment effects 
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of the different ballots against the 3-party ballot as the control condition. This 
result is positive and statistically significant, with a level of confidence of 99 
percent for the Ballot with 10 parties. In Model 2, I tested the same variables but 
controlled for other variables that could influence voter decisions.  
In this second model, the variable of “Ballot with 10 parties” remains 
statistically significant (although with a confidence level of 95 percent, not 99 
percent as in the previous analysis). The variables of Party ID and Ideology are the 
only statistically significant variables in this model, suggesting that a stronger 
partisanship decreases the likelihood of split-ticket voting, as showed in previous 
chapters, and that those closer to the right are less likely to split their ballots. 
The tested model shows that the number of parties on a ballot influences 
participants’ decision to cast a split-ticket vote. These results—with an 
experiment-based and methodologically-sound evidence base—add evidence to 
the literature on the institutional factors of split-ticket voting. 
An important note to the results of the analysis is a possible influence of a 
“Morena” effect in the Ballot with 10 parties. Morena is a new leftist political party 
created in 2011 by Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO). This politician had 
been the presential candidate for the PRD in the 2006 when it came close to win. 
After his defeat AMLO decided to form his own political party in order to run 
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again in the 2012 presidential elections. His renounce to the PRD was viewed as a 
fragmentation to the left in Mexico. In the experiment, Morena was positioned in 
the ballot with 10 parties along with the newest political parties. However, 
differently from the rest, this party seemed to be more attractive to participants 
than the rest. In the experiment, Morena obtained 16% of votes, close to the votes 
received by the PRD (a party with a longer tradition in the Mexican party system, 
and the representant of the political left) in the same ballot (15%).  
Figure 11. Percentage of votes by party in the Ballot with 10 parties 
 
Source: Own analysis and elaboration 
Additionally, from all the splitters in the ballot with 10 parties, 
“Morenistas” represented the 38% of the split vote. And from those who casted a 
straight vote, “Morenistas” represented the 20% (See Figure 12 below). This could 
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suggest that the presence of a specific party and not the number of parties might 
be the underlying factor behind the differences across type of ballots in the 
experiment. More research is needed to address this observation.  
Figure 12. Vote percentage by party and type of vote in the Ballot with 10 parties 
 
Source: Own analysis and elaboration 
Finally, there is an additional note to the results on the experiment that is 
related to the external validity of this exercise. While experiments performed well 
in terms of internal validity it is still relevant to ask whether these results could 
remain in the real world. One important source of concern in this case could be the 
fact that there are no candidate traits nor media campaigns in this experiment. In 
this sense, an experiment design such as the one here presented might be 
underestimating the importance of the split-ticket voting in real world contexts. 
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Conclusions 
Literature on split-ticket voting has focused on understanding the 
phenomenon at the individual level, with researchers having extensively studied 
the mechanisms that explain why voters split their tickets (Alesina and Rosenthal, 
1989; Karp et al 2002; Fiorina 1994; Lacy and Paolino, 1998; Lewis-Beck and 
Nadeau, 2004). The best method for this is analyzing case studies. Individual data 
is easier to find in a single country, and this also allows for controlling external 
factors. These conditions explain the proliferation of case studies on split-ticket 
voting.  
More recently, researchers have started to compare countries with the same 
institutional characteristics. While these efforts have shed light on the importance 
of institutional settings, there was still a gap in knowledge about institutions and 
their effect on split-ticket voting. This paper has filled that gap by studying 13 
countries with different institutional contexts. 
Using the CSES Module 3 as a data source, the results of the multilevel logit 
model showed that the average district magnitude, number of electoral districts, 
the presence of political alliances, the type of electoral system, the presidential 
democracy and the years of democracy, influence the levels of split-ticket voting. 
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These variables maintain their statistical significance, even in the presence of 
individual factors. 
To complement the analysis that was carried out with this large sample size, 
I also designed and conducted an experiment to test whether or not the number of 
parties on a ballot influences the levels of split-ticket voting. This experiment 
strengthened the internal validity of institutions’ relevance with regard to voting 
decisions from the first part of the study. In the experiment, I designed three 
different mock electoral ballots with either 3, 7, or 10 political parties. I recruited 
college students from six major universities in Mexico City to voluntarily 
participate in the experiment. The results showed that those participants who 
received a ballot with ten political options were more likely to split their votes. A 
probit model shows that results are similar when controlling for covariates. 
Finally, the analysis—which included a large sample size distributed across 
ten countries—and the experiment with 304 participants showed that, despite the 
fact that split-ticket voting is an individual choice, institutions matter regardless 
of the context. 
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CHAPTER THREE – PARTY POLITICS AND THE ALLOCATION OF 
RESOURCES: THE CASE OF MEXICO’S RAMO 23 FUND 
Abstract 
During the 70 years when a single political party dominated Mexican 
politics, internal party politics played an important role in distributing resources 
from the federal to the subnational levels. However, international influence and 
increasing accountability demanded by new political actors led to stricter rules 
surrounding the distribution of funds to states and municipalities. Under a new 
context of increasing electoral competition any additional resources to gain 
political leverage are welcomed by political actors. The federal fund denominated 
“Ramo 23” (“Branch 23” in Spanish) is a discretionary budget for subnational 
political actors to use at their convenience as it is not tied to accountability rules. 
Journalistic research has found that this fund is mainly used by governors for 
political purposes (Nuñez, 2018; México Evalúa, 2018; Ortiz, 2018). This paper 
explores the political factors involvement in the allocation of resources by 
analyzing whether governors disburse more resources to co-partisan governments 
at the municipal levels using the Ramo 23. Interviews with different political actors 
suggested that, while governors remain powerful political figures, their influence 
over municipalities have diluted. I constructed a data base with electoral and 
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municipal information for all the municipalities in 2014 and 2015. The analysis of 
the data showed null effects of divided government over the allocation of funds, 
measured as the total amount received and as the number of projects funded by 
the Ramo 23. While a t-test showed statistically significant differences in the 
number of projects assigned across municipalities governed by the same party as 
the state governor however these results did not remain when using an OLS model 
nor the Difference in Differences method. These results reflect the diminishing 
capacity of the political actors to convey federal resources for political purposes.  
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Introduction 
The use of government resources for political objectives is a common 
practice. Political parties require resources to implement their government agenda 
and thus maintain and increase voter support. The resources are translated into 
social programs and public works projects, which then contribute to the 
incumbent government (and their respective political party) remaining in power. 
In this sense, access to resources is an important part of the agenda of political 
parties. 
 Researchers have explored the relationship between party politics and the 
allocation of public resources. Literature shows that parties use public spending 
to gain and/or maintain the support of their constituencies (Nordhaus, 1975; Erie 
1978; Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Levitt and Snyder, 1997). Once in office, winning 
candidates use government’s resources at their disposition with an electoral 
perspective. Social programs and public works are instrumental to political 
parties’ success in the lead-up to an election. 
In countries with low levels of democracy, the linkage between resources 
and politics is stronger than in established democracies (Sung, 2004). James Scott 
(1969) argued that political life in new nations resembled the machine politics of 
the United States in earlier eras. This observation implied that democratization 
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benefits (transparency, accountability, civic engagement, etc.) take time to 
penetrate old political structures. In this way, political dynamics in new 
democracies remain attached to practices of patronage, pork and vote buying. 
Literature shows that increased political competition in a country transitioning to 
a democratic regime motivates politicians to engage in legally questionable 
activities to prevail over their rivals (Little, 1996; Johnston, 1997; della Porta and 
Vannucci, 1999). This chapter examines these political dynamics in the context of 
Mexico’s transition from one-party authoritarian rule to a competitive, multiparty 
democracy.  
In Mexico, the control of the public budget played a decisive role in the 
formation and support of the Institutional Revolutionary Party’s (PRI) hegemonic 
regime (Magaloni, 2006). Starting in 1929, the PRI dominated at all levels in the 
political arena in Mexico for over 70 years. During that period, the PRI used the 
resources at its disposal to stay in government and limit the opposition (Magaloni, 
2006). It was not until 1947 that an opposition party won a municipal election for 
the first time, not until 1989 that they won a state election, and not until 2000 that 
they won the presidency.12 As the opposition was able to open the political arena 
 
12 Although it is widely assumed that the PRI stole the 1988 election 
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to more competition, the rules regarding the distribution of resources began to 
change. Over the past 20 years, Mexico has experienced a context of political 
plurality that has shaped the relationship between budgetary control and political 
actors. 
While the country was experiencing a more competitive political system as 
different parties gained terrain and challenged the PRI’s dominance, on an 
international level there was the surge of a public policy trend favoring 
decentralization and budgetary controls. The pressures on Latin American 
governments to decentralize came from international lending agencies as a 
response to the costs of over-centralization (Willis, Garman and Haggard, 1999). It 
was during the 1990s that decentralization of expenditures accelerated in Mexico 
(Diaz and Merino, 1988). Therefore, the Mexican federal government began 
transferring resources to the states, following rules that did not differentiate on the 
political party governing at a state level. 
Despite the changes described above in the political arena (increasing 
competition and plurality) and a tighter control (and transparency) over federal 
transfers, party politics are still thought to influence resource allocation to the 
states and municipalities (Nuñez, 2018; México Evalúa, 2018; Ortiz, 2018). While 
most of the federal funds include formulas to distribute the resources, the Ramo 
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23 (Ramo meaning “branch” in Spanish) is a fund designed to provide resources 
to municipalities and states to pay for diverse public works projects. In 2017 this 
fund had $35.8 billion pesos available for different projects, ranging from paving 
and maintenance of public parks to social programs for immigrants and disabled 
people. Previous journalist researchers have shown that governors used this fund 
to favor political allies (Nuñez, 2018; México Evalúa, 2018; Ortiz, 2018). However, 
there are no other more formal analyses on the use of this fund for political 
purposes. 
This paper explores the political dynamics, in a context of democratization 
and decentralization, over public spending in Mexico at the subnational level. 
While literature suggests that democratization, and hence political plurality and 
competition, has positive effects over public policy (through an increase in 
accountability, for example) it can also encourage governing parties to deviate 
resources and distribute them in their favor. This chapter aims to contribute to this 
debate by analyzing how federal funds are distributed from the state to the 
municipal levels and if political factors are still relevant. This is thought to be 
particularly apparent at the state level, given that governors must distribute 
resources to municipalities not governed by their political party. 
This paper analyzes whether municipalities governed by a political party 
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different from the governor’s party receive less resources than those from the same 
party. I used mixed research methods to explore this hypothesis.  First, I 
interviewed political actors from different party and government levels, 
contributing a deeper and richer understanding of how political dynamics 
permate the distribution of governmental funds. Second, I constructed a data set 
with observational data at municipal level including information on the number 
of public works approved from the Ramo 23 fund and the amount funded. I also 
included information on the political party affiliations of elected mayors and state 
governors as well as the municipal GDP and the HDI as control variables. The 
analysis used a linear regression and a difference in differences model. 
The first section of the chapter reviews the extant literature on the linkage 
between political parties and the use of public resources. The second section 
describes the available research on the topic for the Mexican case. The third section 
reviews the figure of the state governors in Mexico and their area of political 
influence. The fourth section explains the Mexican fiscal system and the rules to 
allocate federal funds. The fifth section discusses the methods employed in the 
analysis and its results. The final section discusses the future research agenda on 
this topic. 
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The Link Between Political Parties and Budgetary Decisions 
Political parties and public spending are connected in multiple ways. 
Government resources are substantial in most of the countries; in the United States 
they account for 37.7% of GDP and in Mexico for 27.5% of GDP.13 These resources 
become attractive to political parties who depend on them for staying in office 
after elections. During the election period, parties rally around different proposals 
on how to allocate resources to attract voters and once in office, they count on 
those resources to fulfill their promises and get elected again. In this way, 
resources are politicians’ instrument to maintain and increase their political 
parties’ electoral base.  
There are different manners in which political parties can allocate 
governmental resources to achieve their electoral objectives. In general, the 
literature shows two main lines of research on the linkage between political parties 
and resource allocation. First, there is a hypothesis that politicians target resources 
to the areas with the most “swing voters”. Literature on this line of research shows 
how politicians allocate public resources to target areas where there is a high 
concentration of indifferent voters in order to obtain their support. Researchers 
 
13 OECD data for 2016 
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such as Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), Dixit and Londregan (1995, 1996), Colantoni, 
et al. (1975), Snyder (1989), and Stromberg (2008) model this pattern in the use of 
resources. In terms of empirical evidence, Costa (2016) finds that politicians direct 
more resources for the environment, in the form of pork barrel, to ideologically 
homogeneous groups. Also, Kang (2014) finds that presidents target swing voters 
within competitive states by allocating pork barrel projects to areas where the 
opposition is strong. 
The second line of research hypothesizes that politicians will allocate 
resources on areas where they have more “partisan supporters.” Under this 
hypothesis, politicians invest in their core supporters to reward their loyalty (Cox 
and McCubbins, 1986; Dixit and Londregan, 1996). Several studies have shown 
empirical evidence of this way of allocating resources. For example, Owens and 
Wade (1984) examine total and local spending among congressional districts and 
find a linkage between congressional processes and comprehensive district 
allocations. In addition, Levitt and Snyder (1995) measure the amount of the 
transfers received and find congressional incumbents spend an additional $100 
from federal sources per capita than non-incumbents. 
In general, research differentiates between types of resources (public goods 
or direct benefits through pork barrel) and election systems (proportional 
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representation or first-past-the-post). Electoral system matters to politicians since 
it gives them different incentives towards the type of resource to allocate, either 
public goods or pork barrel. For example, Lizzeri and Persico (2001) find that in a 
winner-takes-all-system, pork barrel spending is more likely than public goods, as 
it is easier to target voters. Yet Persson and Tabellini (2004) find that presidential 
systems produce smaller governments than parliamentary systems. 
Accountability and electoral competition are additional factors that come 
into play when analyzing the linkage between public goods provision and politics. 
A common assumption of research in the American literature is that there are rules 
in place to guarantee a fair electoral contestation and accountability in the 
distribution of funds. In this way, there is political plurality and rules in place to 
distribute resources legally. However, these elements are not always present in all 
countries. More recently, researchers have studied the relation between political 
actors and resources allocation in new democracies. For example, Santos’ (2015) 
research in Latin America finds evidence that presidents allocate discretionary 
funds to localities with co-partisan mayors in a decentralized context. Also 
Rosenzweig (2015) finds that, even in dominant-party regimes, electoral 
competition leads to a greater provision of public goods as the ruling party wants 
to build governing majorities. 
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In the 1970s, the “Third Wave” of democratic transitions led to a new line 
of research on political parties and their use of public resources. Clientelistic 
practices14 were found to be the dominant strategies used by political parties in 
authoritarian and colonial regimes (Magaloni, 2006; Tam 2005). While it was 
believed that these practices would disappear after a democracy was established, 
in most cases, these practices have not been eradicated (Chandra, 2004; van de 
Walle, 2007; Auyero, 2001; Kopecký and Spirova, 2011). According to Magaloni, 
Diaz-Cayeros and Estévez (2007), “clientelism remains a political and electoral fact 
of life.” More particularly, evidence has been found that the provision of public 
goods remains lower in new democracies (Keefer and Vlaicu; 2008). 
In new democracies, the linkage between political parties and the electorate 
is mediated, in varying degrees, by strategies of pork. There is ample evidence of 
politicians using of public resources under electoral justifications. In Peru, Schady 
(1999) finds that Peruvian Social Fund FONCODES was used during the Fujimori 
presidency under electoral pretenses. In Mexico, Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez and 
Magaloni (2016) found that PRONASOL, a conditional cash transfer program 
designed to alleviate poverty, was used for political objectives. In Argentina, 
 
14 Clientelism is understood as “the practice of providing personal favors—jobs, contracts, welfare 
support, money, and so forth—in exchange for electoral support” (Berenschot, 2018) 
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Fachelli, Ronconi, and Sangunetti (2006) found that workfare programs were 
susceptible to political manipulation, as some of the beneficiaries did not meet the 
program requirements. 
While there is both theoretical and empirical evidence of how political 
parties redistribute resources to the electorate (either through social programs, 
public works, or even direct money transfers), a less explored linkage is the one 
between political actors governing at different levels and the allocation of 
resources. Early studies argue that the electoral justification behind resource 
allocation across government levels remains. Evidence of this can be found in 
transfers from the federal to state level, state level to municipalities, and even from 
the presidency to municipalities or districts. Evidence of a political based bias in 
the allocation of resources from the presidency can be found in Wright’s (1974) 
research on the United States. His paper finds that interstate inequalities in per 
capita federal spending were the result of an increase in the discretionary 
allocative power of the president during the New Deal period. Recent research 
(Kriner and Reeves, 2015) shows that presidents influence the allocation of federal 
grants to both swing and core constituencies and that the former get particularly 
large boosts in election years. The same electoral rationale can be found at other 
levels of government where the allocation of government resources is at a 
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politician’s discretion. 
Studies focused on subnational level political dynamics have also found 
that politicians follow an electoral mindset when distributing federal/state funds. 
An example of literature that shows evidence of this across state governments and 
municipalities is Herron and Theodos’ research (2004). These authors found that 
the Illinois “member initiative spending” state program distributed resources to 
districts using political criteria. Evidence of allocation of resources, using political 
criteria, can be found in Dahlberg and Johansson’s (2002) work. These researchers 
found that the central Swedish government allocated resources from a temporary 
grant program to municipalities as an electoral strategy. 
The empirical evidence described in this section shows the existence—at all 
levels of government—of a linkage between politics and allocation of resources. 
The political actors could be a president, state governor, representative, or mayor. 
All of them allocate resources in a tactical manner with electoral motivations. In 
the Mexican case, literature on government spending and political forces has been 
shaped by two major historical periods: the hegemony of the PRI and the recent 
process of democratization characterized by an increase in political plurality and 
a process of fiscal decentralization. This changing political context has shaped how 
the political actors interact, and while their electoral motivation is still in place, the 
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rules have changed, and these actors must adapt to survive in future elections. The 
following section describes the particularities of the Mexican context and the 
existent literature on the allocation of public resources by political actors. 
Government Spending and Political Forces in Mexico 
During the PRI’s ruling period, the president had almost absolute policy-
making power since he also held control over both the lower (Chamber of 
Deputies) and upper (Senate) chambers of Congress. The Mexican president had 
a high level of control over the legislative process, with almost a 100% probability 
of having his initiatives—including the federal budget—approved (Nacif, 2006). 
At the same time, the PRI ruled at the subnational level, controlling all state 
governorships and municipalities by maintaining control over the sub-national 
budgets. According to Casanova (1965), electoral success at the subnational level 
compensated for the loss of financial independence from the federal government. 
In summary, the president and his party exerted political and financial dominance 
at all subnational levels, allowing the president to allocate resources as part of an 
electoral strategy. 
In her book, Magaloni (2006) describes how the PRI was able to rule for 
almost 70 years in Mexico. This author argues that the regime’s strategic use of 
government resources through social programs, such as PRONASOL, motivated 
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voters to support the PRI. Under this logic, the fall of the regime began when the 
PRI could no longer use social programs as a currency which lead to an increasing 
political plurality. The conjunction of failed economic policies and a growing 
middle class that did not depend on poverty alleviation programs ultimately came 
together and contributed to the fall of the PRI (Magaloni, 2006). At the same time, 
the opposition began to gain strength, and with that, access to policy-making 
decisions at a subnational level and in Congress.  
The democratization process brought changes in the balance of power at all 
government levels. As the president and his party lost political control and faced 
increasing electoral competition, the political arena went through important 
changes. At the federal level, as the opposition won seats in congress, the source 
of policy-making power shifted from the presidency to congress, diminishing the 
president’s influence over discretionary resource allocation (Nacif, 2006). At the 
state level, as the political arena opened, state governors gained more power over 
decision-making in the political arena and on budgetary matters. During the 
democratization process, governors began to personally pick the candidates for 
federal deputy elections and to use them to convey federal resources to their state 
(Langston, 2010), skew media coverage (Hughes and Lawson, 2004), and even 
influence the selection of mayoral candidates (Langston, 2008). At municipal 
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levels, the process of democratization in Mexico led to increased political 
participation (Bey, 2007), accountability (Armenta, 2009), and public investment 
(Moreno, 2008; World Bank 2007).  
Another effect of the democratization process in the local arena was the 
redefinition of the relationships between political actors. In a context where 
multiple levels of government interact, coordination among politicians from 
different political parties during the resource allocation process is essential. If the 
democratization process is occurring at the same time as policies of fiscal 
decentralization, political frictions will arise as different political parties fight for 
resources. Indeed, this scenario occurred in Mexico. 
In 1990s, Mexico, like many other Latin-American countries, witnessed 
first-hand the international trend of favoring fiscal decentralization process, an 
agenda particularly encouraged by the World Bank (World Bank, 1999, 2000). In 
Mexico, fiscal reforms were passed in 1986, allowing municipalities to collect 
property taxes. In 1988 the states could collect a value-added tax. Three years later, 
in 1991, rules to access federal transfers changed to mitigate the political 
component by adding requirements such as population size. Despite the fact that 
decentralization measures were supposed to improve state and municipal fiscal 
capabilities and implementation of public policies, the results were not completely 
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positive. 
Decentralization in Mexico was carried out with a vertical approach, 
meaning that subnational governments remained heavily dependent on upper 
levels of government (Blanco, 2011). A vertical system was created where the 
federal government transfers resources to the states, which then become 
responsible for distributing these resources to municipalities. As a result, the state 
governors became financial intermediaries between the federal and municipal 
governments. Consequently, municipal dependence on the state for access to 
resources allowed opportunities for political manipulation. And the same could 
be argued in the relationship between the governors and the federal government.   
Figure 13. Process to obtain the funds from the Ramo 23 
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Source: Own elaboration 
The particularities of the decentralization and democratization processes in 
Mexico gave rise to a new political dynamic based on an exchange of resources 
across different government levels. According to Armesto (2013), the governors 
could trade financial resources with municipalities in return for political support 
at local level. He found that municipalities from the same party as the governor 
provided the governor with more political support, and therefore more votes, 
during gubernatorial elections. Gibson (2005) argues that local authorities will try 
to keep control of their provinces as a result of a weakening of the center, giving 
rise to authoritarian “enclaves.” In this way, there is an indication that the linkage 
between political parties and the allocation of resources could prevail, even under 
a new context of political plurality and decentralization. One example of this are 
the declarations of the governor of Nayarit state in Mexico during the 2014 local 
elections, when he stated that if the opposition won the capital of the state, they 
would not receive any support from his government.15 
However, recent literature shows mixed evidence on the influence that 
politics may have on the allocation of resources in Mexico. While there is research 
 
15 López, Mayolo (2014), “Piden contrapeso a Gobernador de Nayarit” in Reforma newspaper, 
published on June 2014, Mexico City. 
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that shows the political use of resources, other papers found the opposite. For 
example, on one hand, Reyes-Hernández and Mejía-Reyes (2016) find evidence of 
the existence of a fiscal policy cycle. These authors find that the total public 
expenditure, current expenditure, and capital expenditure reflect the intervention 
of opportunistic politicians. On the other hand, Díaz-Cayeros and Silva’s (2004) 
research discards the possibility that resources from federal funds targeted at 
municipal infrastructure are distributed with political criteria. 
In addition, even in the literature that does find a linkage between politics 
and allocation of resources across subnational governments, the sign of the effect 
is not the same. In other words, that state governments could or could not favor 
municipalities governed by the same party. For example, Timmons and Broid 
(2013) find that, despite the existence of strict formulas for the distribution of 
resources from the state to the municipal level, there is a deviation of 300 to 500 
million pesos per year from the formula. They argue that this finding implies that 
governors still use political criteria to allocate resources as PRI governors redirect 
resources to municipalities governed by the same party by taking advantage of 
controlling the institutions in charge of auditing at the state level.. However, 
Flamand (2006) argues the opposite, that being the political opposition at 
subnational level leads to an increase in resources. This author finds that states 
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governed by political parties other than the president's party (PRI) and those that 
are electorally competitive received greater increases in conditional and 
unconditional transfers than those dominated by the PRI and those that are less 
competitive. He argues that the president must exchange resources with state 
governors not from his party in order to be able to implement his policy agenda 
and translate this into voter support. 
Evidence of political influence in government spending is not clear, even at 
the same level of government. For example, Ramírez and Erquizio (2012) found 
that state governors manipulate government spending but not federal transfers 
during electoral years. Only PRI governors use federal transfers as a political 
strategy in election year (Ramirez and Erquizio, 2012). This paper aims to 
contribute to the current debate on whether the use of resources is influenced or 
not by political motivations. 
Mexican Governors’ Political Power 
During the PRI’s hegemony, politics and government were intertwined as 
the leader of the PRI was also the country’s president. In this period, governors 
were considered “envoys” of the President, who had the power to remove at will. 
For example, the governor of Tabasco, Salvador Neme Castillo, was removed by 
the president Carlos Salinas de Gortari from his position after only three years of 
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being elected (Beltran, 2013) due to political uprisings in his state. Even more, 
governorships were considered a “consolation prize” for those politicians who 
didn’t make it to federal level government. Not only did governors lack any 
political power beyond presidential needs; they even lacked the economic power 
to implement their agenda. Casanova (1965) argued that governors gladly gave 
away their fiscal autonomy to the center. However, this only meant that governors 
were not able to contest presidential authority, not that they didn’t hold any 
political power in their states. Literature shows that state governors are powerful 
figures. 
Hernandez-Rodriguez (2003) argues that state governors’ political power 
was never meant to challenge the president’s authority but to have a tight political 
control in their territories. Governors’ political power comes from the early 
formation of the Mexican state. According to Meyer (1978), governors were 
responsible for maintaining the peace at the local level by controlling local leaders 
and caudillos. And to be able to do that, governors required a high degree of 
control over other political actors. 
State governors were able to name their successor and to influence the 
selection of federal deputies. These two elements of political power have not 
changed in the recent context of democratization. Gibson (2005) argues that old 
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practices such as the governors’ capacity to name his successor are still in place. 
This author describes how the former governor of Oaxaca, Murat, designed and 
helped to win the governorship his candidate. In addition, governors still 
influence the selection of the candidates to federal deputies. According to 
Langston (2016), since the demise of the PRI dominance in the 1990s, governors 
from all political parties have held increasing power over the selection of the single 
member district (SMD) candidates for the Chamber of Deputies. The control of 
political careers and jobs at the state level were enough incentives for Federal 
Deputies to be aligned with the Governor (Langston, 2016). In this manner, 
governors are still an important political figure at the subnational level as they 
have control over the political career of federal deputies and aspiring candidates 
to the governorship.  
Even more, governors’ influence has increased as they now have more 
resources to implement their agenda due to the process of decentralization. For 
example, Timmons and Broid (2010) found that governors can allocate federal 
resources to municipalities governed by the same political party, even in the 
presence of binding formulas. This is possible since due to the weak auditing 
institutions and a lack of accountability. These researchers found deviations from 
the formula of approximately US$300-500M per year in states governed by the PRI. 
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This paper contributes to the debate on whether the current Mexican 
context of political plurality and decentralization has changed politicians' impulse 
to allocate resources as an electoral strategy. By testing the hypothesis of whether 
Mexican state governors still use their influence in the allocation of resources to 
favor their co-partisans, this paper explores the linkage between political parties 
and the allocation of resources at subnational level in Mexico and the political logic 
behind it. 
To test the hypothesis stated above, the analysis in this paper was based on 
the allocation of resources from the Ramo 23 fund. States and municipalities can 
apply to receive funding from this fund and may use it for a wide variety of 
projects, from public works to programs for the disabled. In the following section, 
I describe the fiscal context in Mexico and the rules for federal transfers and funds.  
Sources of Funding for Political Actors in Mexico, Rules Explained  
Mexico is a federal republic with a national government, 32 states, and 2,477 
municipalities. During the PRI’s hegemonic regime, the fiscal system in Mexico 
was highly centralized. The third National Tax Convention in 1947 established the 
foundations for a strong central government by reducing or eliminating the 
subnational governments’ capacity to collect taxes. At the same time, the federal 
government became responsible for collecting a national sales tax and income tax. 
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The federal government became the manager of these resources and would then 
later transfer them to the states. According to Diaz-Cayeros, Gonzalez, and Rojas 
(2002), subnational governments accepted this agreement in exchange for 
patronage and political careers at the national level. Therefore, by 1973, all states 
had abandoned their sales taxes. 
By the beginning of the 1980s, the Federation had centralized nearly 85% of 
public spending (Cabrero, 2013). It was in 1980 when the first steps towards fiscal 
decentralization started. The National Fiscal Coordination System (SNCF for its 
Spanish acronym) of Pacto Fiscal was created to define and regulate the country’s 
fiscal relationships. The Pacto Fiscal proposed a value-added tax (VAT) to replace 
the existing sales tax, and states yielded their share of revenues on the sales tax in 
exchange for a share of unconditional revenue transfers from the VAT, the federal 
income tax, and oil fees.  
After this first step towards fiscal decentralization, additional reforms were 
implemented in 1983 giving municipalities more independence over fiscal matters 
and over public policy decision-making. According to Beltrán and Portilla (1986), 
the reforms were intended to strengthen federalism, reinvigorate municipalities, 
and promote regional development. These reforms granted municipalities three 
faculties: provision of public services, collection of property taxes, and authority 
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to define, approve, and manage land use and development plans. 
Decentralization efforts continued in the following years, transferring more 
collection responsibilities to subnational levels and regulating the federal funds 
they received. In 1988 the states began to collect VATs, granting them a source 
with which to finance their own governmental agenda. In 1991 a size-based 
criterion was implemented for the distribution of federal funds (non-earmarked 
federal transfers) to the states. Another fiscal reform was then enacted in 1999 
allowing municipalities to request that state governments transfer control over 
certain services to them. As a result, municipalities gained power over public 
resources, even though the state governments still controlled the decision-making 
process surrounding service delivery at the local level.  
Current subnational governments budget come from three major sources: 
their own resources (obtained through local tax collection), debt, and federal 
transfers (see Figure 14.) 
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Figure 14. Sources of Funding for Municipalities in Mexico. 
Source: Own analysis and elaboration 
From the federal government, the state and municipal governments receive 
transfers principally through four funds: Ramo 25, Ramo 28, Ramo 33, Ramo 23 
(“Ramo” meaning “branch” in Spanish). Each of these funds have their own set of 
operation rules and objectives: 
• The Ramo 25 is a specific fund focused on education and aimed to provide 
resources to Mexico City as the nation’s capital (the federal district). Its 
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origin as an exclusive source of funding comes from an initial effort to 
decentralize education, as many federal universities are located there. In 
this case, the federal district was always treated as a special case compared 
to other states, the reason behind this district receiving a specific fund. This 
fund represents only 3% of the federal transfers to subnational 
governments. 
• The Ramo 28 is also known as “participaciones” (participations) and is 
made up of net-block transfers of funds from the taxes collected at the 
federal level. This fund is distributed using a formula based primarily on 
two elements: tax collection effort and population size. These resources 
represent 45% of the transfers from the federal level. 
• The Ramo 33 or “aportaciones” (contributions) are earmarked federal 
transfers. These conditional transfers are the budgetary mechanism 
designed to transfer resources to states and municipalities for them to 
strengthen their capacity in areas such as education, health, basic 
infrastructure, public safety, and social assistance programs. This fund 
represents 44% of the federal transfers to subnational governments. 
• The Ramo 23 is an instrument of budgetary policy for subnational 
governments to meet general federal government obligations not enclosed 
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within a specific ministry. Specific ministry (for example, Ministry of 
Health) spending is allocated separately and according to ministry-specific 
targets and guidelines. Ramo 23 represents 8% of the federal transfers to 
subnational governments.  
Figure 15 shows the distribution of the federal transfers to states in millions 
of pesos. These four funds represent the main resources made available to state 
governors and municipalities.  
Figure 15. Federal Transfers to States 
Source: Mexico’s Finance Ministry 
Following the logic of distributing resources under an electoral perspective 
discussed in the first sections of this paper, political actors will seek access to as 
many resources as possible to carry out their agenda. The resources of the Ramo 
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28 follow rules of distribution with no space for negotiation to increase them, while 
the resources of the Ramo 33 must be used on specific projects and are subject to 
closer supervision and audits from federal authorities. Under these premises, the 
Ramo 23, due to its characteristics, is the most viable source of additional resources 
for political manipulation out of all the available funds.  
According to Nuñez (2018), as there are no rules for the distribution of 
Ramo 23 funds, it is an example of “the use of public resources as a tool of political 
control.” This fund was created in the beginning of the 1980s for disbursements 
unrelated to any other available fund, but in the 1990s its name was changed to 
the “Salary and Economic Provisions Fund.” Currently, it is composed of different 
budgetary pockets with diverse objectives such as sewage, pavement, natural 
disaster relief, public servants’ pensions, and others. The fund is disbursed with 
the Finance Ministry first assigning an annual budget (the amount is discretionally 
set) to each of the components of the Ramo 23. In this part of the process, journalist 
researchers have found that the Federal government used this Ramo to benefit the 
governors from the PRI. Ramírez and Hernández (2019) pointed out that Nuevo 
Leon received in 2015 a total of $4.7 billion pesos while governed by the PRI but 
after the elections the state only received $1.1 billion pesos as an independent 
candidate won the governorship. Similarities can be found in the cases of Veracruz 
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($2.2 billion pesos while governed by the PRI and $1.5 billion pesos under the 
PAN) and Chihuahua ($1.4 billion pesos versus $0.8 billion pesos after the PAN 
candidate won the state elections) (Ramírez and Hernández, 2019).   
After the Ministry of Finance has approved the annual budget then the 
federal deputies vote on which projects to allocate the resources. In this part of the 
process, Governors can have a political leverage as the federal deputies owed them 
their position. Finally, while any state government or municipality can apply for 
those resources, the funds are sent to the State governors who are responsible for 
their disbursement to the municipalities. Governors can use the resources at will 
or even delay for a year the distribution of the funds. There are no official records 
on the use of the resources of the Ramo 23. Officially, there are only records on the 
amounts approved for public works projects and the amount that was expended. 
The governors are not obligated to provide proof of the actual use of the resources 
(García, 2016). 
Two trends suggest that this fund is a target of political manipulation. First, 
the budget of this specific fund has increased every year since 2012 (Figure 16). 
Second, the pocket of resources assigned to this fund are easily increased 
throughout the year. In 2016, the Ramo 23 initially had a budget of $141 billion 
pesos, but after different increases, by the end of the year the amount distributed 
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to the states and municipalities was $247 billion pesos, an increase of 70%, as 
pointed out by Nuñez (2008).  
Figure 16. Ramo 23 Funds 
Source: Mexico’s Finance Ministry 
In addition to Nuñez (2008), journalist researchers have uncovered that 
politicians use this fund in an opportunistic manner for electoral purposes. Several 
cases of funds deviation for elections involving state governors and their use of 
Ramo 23 funds have been documented (Ortiz, 2018; Mexico Evalúa, 2018; Soto, 
2017; Ramírez and Hernández, 2019). For example, research by Mexico Evalúa (a 
Mexican think tank) found that the funds of the Ramo 23 are used for electoral 
purposes as the transfers increase the year before elections (México Evalúa, 2018). 
According to Hernandez (2008), governors have historically had larger power 
ambitions and the way they administer the state budget reflects that idea of 
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strengthening their local influence. 
The characteristics of the Ramo 23 are ideal to search for evidence of the 
linkage between politics and resource allocation. In the following section, this 
paper tests the hypothesis that state governors favor municipalities governed by 
co-partisans by assigning more public works projects using Ramo 23 funds. 
Interviews and the demise of Governor’s influence 
Increasing democratization has also increased political plurality in Mexico. 
While in 1989, only 39 municipalities were governed by the political opposition, in 
2000 over 500 were. And by 2012 the PAN occupied the presidency and governed 
in seven states with the PRD governing in three (see Figure 17). This new context 
of different parties governing at different levels has changed the way in which 
political actors interact to allocate resources. Currently, there is not only more 
competition between political parties in the political arena but also less 
opportunities to obtain funds. Within this new setting, funds from the Ramo 23 
become increasingly attractive to politicians. 
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Figure 17. State Governorships by Political Party in 2014 
 
Source: Instituto Nacional Electooral. Own analysis and elaboration 
To test the hypothesis of whether governors favor the allocation of 
resources into municipalities governed by co-partisans I conducted a series of 
interviews with former politicians and public servants. The objective of the 
interviews was to understand the mechanisms behind governors’ decisions to 
transfer resources to municipalities. To ensure a complete understanding, I 
interviewed not only politicians, but also public servants working in treasury 
Political Party Number of 
governorships
PRI 21
PAN 5
PRD 4
PVEM 1
Convergencia 1
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departments. People I interviewed included: 
1. A former state governor from the PRI, 
2. A former municipal president from the PAN under a PRD 
governorship, 
3. A former municipal president from the PRD under a PRD 
governorship, 
4. A former senator from the PAN, 
5. A former finance secretary at the federal level from the PAN, 
6. A former state finance secretary from the PRD, and 
7. A former advisor to the municipal finance director of the PRD. 
These interviews with former politicians and public servants from different 
government levels and political parties allowed me a more comprehensive and 
balanced picture of the factors that motivated their decisions related to the 
allocation of funding in their sphere of influence. 
The interviews were conducted in person or over the phone. Each interview 
lasted between 30-60 minutes and followed a semi-structured questionnaire 
previously shared with the interviewee. The questionnaire contained 14 questions 
about the political dynamics at the subnational level and how they could influence 
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the allocation of resources. The questionnaire worked as a guide to the 
conversation but did not limit it. 
With the sole exception of the former governor, the interviewees agreed 
that politics still play a relevant role in the decision on how to allocate resources. 
However, they coincide in the fact that rules surrounding the administration of 
government budgets have become stricter. While the federal government 
currently uses automatic transfers to the municipalities in other Branches or 
Ramos, reducing a governor’s influence over those resources, Ramo 23 funds have 
become an easy target for politicians looking to have access to resources for pork 
barrel projects. 
As confirmed during the interviews, Ramo 23 is one of the principal sources 
of additional expenditure of subnational governments. However, the rules to 
obtain resources from this fund have shifted the decision-making power of 
resource allocation from the governors to the federal deputies. According to the 
interviewees, since the Chamber of Deputies is the institution that approves the 
specific use of the resources, the federal deputies have become the gatekeepers of 
the Ramo 23 funds. And while the governors still maintain political influence over 
federal deputies, municipal presidents must also attempt to gain the favor of a 
federal deputy in order to receive more funds. 
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The interviews hinted that political dynamics have changed, and 
governor’s area of influence has shrunken as other actors are involved in the 
process of allocation of funds. In this manner, governors have an indirect control 
over the amount and number of projects that get funding from the Ramo 23.  
Overall, from the interviews I conclude that the current context of political 
plurality and decentralization have shaped the way politics influence resource 
allocation, making it more complex than before. Political forces are still in play, 
but continuously changing and adapting. Nowadays governors have to interact 
with the Finance Ministry to guarantee a pocket of resource enough to finance their 
projects and whit the Federal Deputies to convince them to vote for the approval 
of the funding. These new political dynamics are the result of an increased 
electoral competition and tighter rules to obtain funds that can be used 
discretionarily. 
Formal analysis of the Ramo 23 disbursements 
For the empirical analysis of this paper, I constructed a data set with 
electoral information from 2,025 municipalities out of the 2,417 municipalities in 
the country.16 I gathered data on the party in government, both at the state and 
 
16 The missing municipalities corresponded to those who did not hold elections because they are 
ruled under their local indigenous traditions or there was no information available. 
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municipal levels, the number of projects financed by the Ramo 23 for each 
municipality in 2014 and the amount approved.17 These last variables are called 
project and amount and are the dependent variable of the analysis. With this 
information, I tested the degree to which the number of projects or amount 
increased or decreased in a municipality depending on which party governed at 
the state level.  
During 2014, 1,464 projects were financed by the Ramo 23 at a municipal 
level. On average, each municipality obtained approval for 3.6 projects.18 While 
the average number of projects might seem low, it is important to keep in mind 
that the average amount of funding paid to municipalities in 2014 was 17,162,696 
pesos. The municipality that received the most funding was the city of Oaxaca, in 
Oaxaca state, with 1,056,964,308 pesos and the municipality that received the least 
was Santo Domingo, in the state of San Luis Potosi, with 20,000 pesos. It is worth 
mentioning that 727 municipalities—or 36% of all the municipalities analyzed—
did not receive funding from Ramo 23. In contrast, there were some special cases, 
such as the municipality of Toluca, the capital of Mexico State, that obtained 
 
17 Data at a municipal level is only available for 2014 and 2015. 
18 Only including those that received funds from this Ramo. 
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approval for 87 projects. It is worth noticing that the president at that moment was 
the former governor of that state, suggesting favoritism towards that municipality. 
Our variable of interest in this paper is whether the municipality is 
governed or not by a governor’s co-partisan. This is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of 0 if the municipal president and the state governor are from the same 
party, and 1 if the opposite occurs. This is a dummy for divided government, not 
for co-partisan government. Taking this into consideration, in the data we have 
893 municipalities governed by the opposition (44%) and 1,131 municipalities 
governed by the same party as the state governor (55%). In raw numbers, in 2014, 
the PRI governed in 21 states, the PAN in five, the PRD in four, the PVEM in one, 
and Convergencia (now called Movimiento Ciudadano) in one.19 At municipal level, 
the PRI still dominated with 1,052 municipalities (52%), followed by the PAN with 
516 municipalities (25%), the PRD with 204 (10%), and the other parties the 
remainder. 
The data also shows that the PRI is the party with the most municipalities 
from the same party as the governor, in contrast with the PRD that only has 39% 
 
19 It is important to note that political alliances are allowed for state elections; in other words, one 
candidate can be running with the support of two or more political parties. To avoid confusion, I 
considered the candidate’s original partisanship when defining the winning party. 
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of municipalities where the state governor is co-partisan (see Table 14). 
Table 14. Distribution of municipalities and state governments by political 
party 
Political 
Party 
Number of 
governed 
municipalities 
Number of 
municipalities 
under a state 
government from 
the same party 
Number of 
municipalities under 
a state government 
from a different party 
PRI 1,052 751 71% 301 29% 
PAN 516 238 46% 278 54% 
PRD 204 80 39% 124 61% 
Source: Mexico’s Finance Ministry 
In terms of the amounts received by the Ramo 23 and its distribution I find 
that municipalities governed by the same party as the governor (1,131) received 
an average of $13.45 million pesos while those governed by a different party 
received an average of $11.10 million pesos. Municipalities governed by the PRI 
received on average $11.7 million pesos, those governed by the PAN received $14 
million pesos, and those governed by the PRD received $20 million pesos.   
If we look at the intersection between the number of projects and the 
political characteristics of the municipalities, we find that those municipalities 
from the same party as the governor receive, on average, more projects financed 
by the Ramo 23 (2.86) than those not from the same party (2.28). Descriptive 
statistics also show that PAN municipalities received an average of 2.3 projects, 
PRI municipalities an average of 2.7, and PRD municipalities an average of 4 
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projects. The fact that PRD municipalities clearly receive more projects than the 
rest of the parties drew my attention, especially as most of its governed 
municipalities operate under state governments from other political parties. A 
closer look at the data reveals that under PRD governorships, the PRD 
municipalities received 64% of the projects financed by Ramo 23 in that state. This 
would suggest that PRD governors are more efficient in the allocation of resources 
to their co-partisans. 
The next step in the analysis was to test whether the two groups (same party 
vs. different party) are statistically different. To do that, an independent t-test was 
run on 2025 municipalities to determine if there were differences in the average 
number of projects and amount of funds by Ramo 23 between municipalities 
governed by a co-partisan and under divided government. The number of 
municipalities under divided government was 894 while the number of 
municipalities governed by the same party as the state governor was 1,131. The 
results of the t-test showed that municipalities under divided government 
received statistically significantly lower number of projects (2.28 ± 0.14 projects) 
compared to municipalities governed by the same party as the governor (2.86 ± 
0.17 projects), t(2023) = 2.45, p = 0.014. In terms of the amount of funds received, 
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the results of the t-test showed that the groups means are not significantly different 
as t(2022) = 1.08, p = 0.279.  
While this test finds a statistically significant difference between the means 
of each group, I complemented these results by conducted a linear regression 
model. This econometric analysis allows to include other independent variables 
that might influence Ramo 23 allocations such as municipalities’ characteristics. In 
this analysis the dependent variable was either the number of projects assigned to 
each municipality or the amount of funds transferred, and the independent 
variables were co-partisan status of municipalities with the state governor, the 
absolute margin of victory of the winning party at municipal elections, a dummy 
on whether the municipality is the state’s capital, a dummy for each major political 
party, the Human Development Index and a proxy to the municipal GDP20  as 
control variables.  
We would expect a negative sign for the “divided government” variable, as 
municipalities from a political party different from the governor’s party will have 
 
20 The are no data for GDP at municipal level but I used the total value of production from the 
2014 Economic Census. Available at the Sistema Automatizado de Información Censal (SAIC)  
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fewer projects or funds. The absolute margin of victory is a variable that will let us 
test of whether governors are allocating project funding or resources to swing 
municipalities. It is measured as the absolute value of the margin of victory for the 
party of the incumbent governor. We will expect a negative sign if more projects 
or funding are assigned to municipalities where the party won by a close margin. 
The variable of capital is expected to have a positive sign over the resources and 
number of projects funding as it is where the governors live and is usually the 
most important city in the state. The variables for the political parties were defined 
so as to show if certain political parties are more effective at relocating project 
funding or resources than others. I also included a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the governor is from the same party as the president. As mentioned 
above, journalist research has showed that the federal government has transferred 
more funding to states governed by the PRI. As control variables I used a proxy 
for the municipality’s GDP and the Human Development Index (HDI). We would 
expect larger economies and those with more social needs to receive more funding 
from Ramo 23. The HDI is a summary measure of average fulfillment of three 
dimensions: living a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable, and having a 
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decent standard of living.21 We expected to see a negative sign on this variable, as 
the projects and funding from Ramo 23 were allegedly assigned to those 
municipalities that needed more resources.  
  
 
21 Definition of the United Nations Development Program, http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-
development-index-hdi 
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Table 16. OLS Model outcomes 
 DV Amount DV Number of projects 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
     
Divided government -2.349 0.576 -0.583** -0.102 
 (2.170) (2.830) (0.231) (0.225) 
Capital  -4.114  0.269 
  (3.795)  (0.695) 
Absolute % Victory  16.71*  0.460 
  (9.324)  (0.756) 
PRI  2.095  0.663*** 
  (2.451)  (0.240) 
PAN  4.988**  0.328 
  (2.408)  (0.262) 
PRD  11.01***  2.110*** 
  (4.123)  (0.488) 
GDP  178.3***  23.75*** 
  (27.35)  (2.351) 
HDI  -2.74e-05**  -5.14e-06*** 
  (1.12e-05)  (1.32e-06) 
Constant 13.45*** -110.2*** 2.866*** -13.58*** 
 (1.442) (18.87) (0.176) (1.515) 
     
Observations 2,024 2,020 2,024 2,020 
R-squared 0.001 0.080 0.003 0.123 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own analysis and elaboration 
The results in Table 16 shows that, when the dependent variable is the 
amount of funding from the Ramo 23, in Model 1 the variable of interest had the 
expected sign but is not statistically significant. In Model 2, I included controls and 
I found that the divided government variable is not statistically and with an 
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opposite sign. Other variables that are statistically significant in this model are the 
absolute victory margin, PAN, PRD, GDP and the HDI. The amount of funding 
that a municipality received when it not a swing municipality increases by $16 
million pesos and it is statistically significant. This result would suggest that the 
amount of funding that municipalities receive are not related to governors seeking 
to gain political terrain in contested municipalities. Regarding the party variables, 
this model shows that municipalities governed by the PAN and the PRD obtain 
more funding from the Ramo 23. Both of municipality’s characteristics variables 
are statistically significant and with the expected signs. This confirms that the 
projects and funding from the Ramo 23 are targeted to municipalities with larger 
economies and to those with more social needs. Most likely to improve the existent 
infrastructure rather than creating new. A closer look at the type of projects funded 
will shed light on this result.  
In the same way that I tested the amount of funding as a dependent variable 
I used the number of projects as the dependent variable. This analysis showed that 
this variable alone (Model 1) has the expected sign and it is statistically significant. 
Which suggest that governors give more projects to municipalities governed by 
his party rather than more funding. However, when control variables were 
included in the model, the variable of interest (divided government) lost statistical 
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significance but the sign remain the same. The PRI, PRD, GDP and the HDI 
variables are statistically significant in this model. Municipalities governed by the 
PRI and the PRD receive more projects funded by the Ramo 23. And municipalities 
with larger economies and less developed municipalities receive more projects, 
which is a similar result as when the dependent variable is the amount of funding. 
While the linear regression model showed that party politics are not 
relevant to resource allocation, a possible explanation to this result can be related 
to the linear regression. A shortcoming of this method is the “no confounding” 
assumption. This means that may be other differences between municipalities, not 
accounted for in the model that explain why some municipalities receive more 
projects or funding than others. If these differences are systematically related to 
co-partisanship, they introduce bias into the estimate for divided government 
variable. An alternative approach is to use a research design to eliminate as 
possible confounder any characteristics of municipalities that do not vary over 
time. A difference in difference model (DiD) could be an attractive choice when 
pre-treatment information is available (Lechner, 2010). 
I thus ran a DiD model, a quasi-experimental method. The use of DiD 
methods has become very widespread following the work of Ashenfelter and Card 
(1985). DiD methods can be used to estimate the effect of a specific intervention or 
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treatment by comparing the changes in outcomes over time between a population 
that is receiving the treatment (the intervention group) and a population that is 
not (the control group). 22  In our case, the specific treatment was whether the 
municipal government was a co-partisan of the state governor. The formal model 
is: 
y = β0 + β1Db + δ0d2 + δ1d2 * dB + u 
where y is the outcome of interest, and d2 is a dummy variable for the second time 
period. The dummy variable dB captures possible differences between the 
treatment and control groups prior to the policy change. The time period dummy, 
d2, captures aggregate factors that would cause changes in y even in the absence 
of a policy change. The coefficient of interest, δ1, multiplies the interaction term, d2 
* dB, which is essentially a dummy variable equal to one for those observations in 
the treatment group in the second period. The difference-in-differences estimate 
is: 
?̂?𝟏 = (𝒚𝑩,𝟐̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ −  𝒚𝑩,𝟏̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) − (𝒚𝑨,𝟐̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ −  𝒚𝑨,𝟏̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) 
 
22 Difference-in-Difference Estimation, https://www.mailman.columbia.edu/research/population-
health-methods/difference-difference-estimation 
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The model then had to be tested with real-world data from Ramo 23, using 
the data for 2014 and 2015.23 In 2015 only eight states (Chiapas, Distrito Federal, 
Guanajuato, Jalisco, México, Morelos, Tabasco y Yucatan) and 934 municipalities 
had elections.24 In this dataset, we can observe that the average amount received 
by a municipality from the Ramo 23 was $12.4 million pesos in 2014 and $18.9 
million pesos in 2015. In terms of the number of projects, the average number of 
projects funded by the Ramo 23 was 2.6 in 2014 and 3.9 in 2015. The maximum 
number of projects funded was 87 in 2014 and 78 in 2015 (for the municipality of 
Acapulco in the State of Guerrero, both governed by the PRD). The results of the 
DiD model are in Table 17. 
  
 
23 At the time of this study, the only public available data on Ramo 23 at the municipal level was 
for 2014 and 2015. 
24 I run the same OLS analysis for this subsample of states and municipalities and the results hold. 
See table 8 in the Appendix 
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Table 17. Differences in Differences Model 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Amount Project 
   
Time -5.696** -1.218*** 
 (2.238) (0.275) 
Treated -0.640 -0.231 
 (2.578) (0.300) 
DiD -1.710 -0.352 
 (3.364) (0.378) 
Constant 19.15*** 4.084*** 
 (1.692) (0.212) 
   
Observations 4,048 4,048 
R-squared 0.004 0.014 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own analysis and elaboration 
The results of the analysis show that the estimator DiD while have a 
negative effect as expected is not statistically significant for any of the dependent 
variables tested. This can be interpreted as political ties not affecting the transfer 
of resources from the governorship to the municipalities. 
Conclusions 
Politicians and resources have always been intertwined. Extensive evidence 
exists in the literature describing the linkage between politics and resource 
allocation. From the federal legislative or executive branches down to subnational 
local governance, political actors have incentives to use public resources 
142 
 
strategically. However, political dynamics are continually changing—and in some 
countries faster than in others. 
In this sense, Mexico’s political parties experienced a changing scenario that 
opened the political arena into a more plural space while simultaneously granting 
access to federal funding for subnational governments during the process of 
decentralization. My analysis presented here was a methodological attempt at 
understanding the effect that this new set of rules had on power dynamics. 
In particular, the analysis of the Ramo 23 provided a controlled case where 
it was possible to operationalize governor political influence over municipal 
operations, as the Ramo 23 fund has been described as the principal source of 
political manipulation. Descriptive statistics have previously shown how 
municipalities governed by the same political party as the governor received a 
larger quantity of projects funded by the Ramo 23, with noticeable examples such 
as the PRD and the city of Toluca. However, the econometric analysis presented 
here did not find that a governor’s political influence had a substantial effect over 
municipal-level resource allocation. These results confirm what the former 
politicians and public servants affirmed during their interviews, that political 
dynamics have changed with the process of democratization and 
decentralizations. And now, political actors such as the state governors, whom 
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once had direct control over resources, are required to negotiate with other levels 
of government. 
The interviews showed that federal deputies have become intermediaries 
between the funds of the Ramos 23 and the subnational governments, diminishing 
the figure of the governor as the main decision-maker over the use of federal 
resources. Future research agenda should track the new role of the federal 
deputies as gatekeepers of federal funding in greater depth. At the same time a 
different econometrical approach with more comprehensive and newer data, as it 
is made available, could shed light on the political dynamics in the use of the Ramo 
23 in Mexico. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1. Multilevel Logistic Model of Split Ticket Voting, Random 
Intercept Model for Institutional Variables 
 
 
 (3) 
Variables Model 3 
  
First Level  
Female  
  
Education  
  
Campaign involvement  
  
Political leader  
  
Nonpartisan  
  
Political knowledge  
  
Political ideology  
  
Size of city  
  
Second Level  
Log number of electoral districts 0.744 
 (0.692) 
Average district magnitude 0.0426 
 (0.0665) 
Alliances formed -0.236 
 (1.444) 
Majoritarian -1.263 
 (0.956) 
Proportional 1.821 
 (1.158) 
Mixed - 
  
Presidential democracy 0.0318 
 (0.154) 
Years of democracy 0.00709 
 (0.00529) 
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Constant -5.173 
 (3.935) 
  
Observations 16,681 
Number of groups 13 
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Appendix 2. Characteristics of the participants by type of vote 
  Straight 
voters 
Split-ticket 
voters 
Difference 
 % % % 
Gender 
Male 57% 58% +1% 
Female 43% 42% -1% 
Interest in 
politics 
Very 
interested 
32% 39% +7% 
Somewhat 
interested 
48% 43% -5% 
Slightly 
interested 
14% 15% +1% 
Not 
interested 
7% 3% -2% 
Party 
identification 
PRI 7% 11% +4% 
PAN 58% 24% -34% 
PRD: 5% 5% 0 
Other: 0 4% +4% 
None: 30% 56% +26% 
Ideology 
1 4% 3% -1% 
2 6% 2% -4% 
3 2% 14% +12% 
4 4% 13% +9% 
5 20% 26% +6% 
6 16% 11% -5% 
7 20% 16% -3% 
8 20% 10% 10% 
9 3% 2% -1% 
10 5% 3% -2% 
Approval of 
current 
administratio
n 
Strongly 
agree 
1% 0% -1% 
Agree 
somewhat 
10% 14% +4% 
Neither 11% 9% -2% 
Somewhat 
disagree 
24% 29% +5% 
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Strongly 
disagree 
54% 48% -6% 
Retrospective 
voting 
Improved 1% 1% 0 
Somewhat 
improved 
6% 9% +3% 
Still the same 16% 17% -1% 
Somewhat 
worsen 
45% 43% -2% 
Worse 32% 30% -2% 
Pocketbook 
voting 
Improved 5% 5% 0 
Somewhat 
improved 
25% 16% -9% 
Still the same 41% 45% +4% 
Somewhat 
worsen 
22% 27% +5% 
Worse 7% 16% 0 
Media 
attention 
Daily 12% 16% +4% 
Weekly 49% 53% +4% 
Monthly 15% 10% -5% 
Occasionally 17% 16% -1% 
Never 7% 5% -2% 
[1]Additional factors influence Brazil’s case, but I will discuss this in the paragraph of new vs 
established democracies. 
[2]More information on http://www.cses.org/datacenter/module3/module3.htm 
[3]Marshall et al. (2008), Polity IV Project: Dataset User’s Manual, Center for Systemic Peace 
  
  
Appendix 3. Description of the electoral institutions of the 13 countries analyzed 
 Country Description Electoral 
districts 
Average 
district 
magnitude 
Alliances 
in 
practice 
Electoral 
system type 
Type of 
executive 
Institutionalized 
Democracy 
1 Australia The Australian 
electoral system 
is preferential 
voting. Voters 
cast a ballot for 
one party in the 
lower house and 
for a different 
party in the 
upper house. 
150 1 Yes Majoritarian Parliamentary 107 
2 Brazil The Chamber of 
Deputies 
consists of 513 
representatives 
elected for the 27 
units of the 
Federation, there 
is no 
proportional 
apportionment 
between the 
27 19 Yes Proportional Presidential 26 
14
8 
  
population of 
each state and 
their seats in the 
Chamber of 
Deputies.  
3 Chile The chamber has 
120 members. 
60 2 Yes Proportional Presidential 20 
4 Estonia The Riigikogu 
has 101 
members. 
57 5.26 Yes Proportional Parliamentary 21 
5 Germany The Bundestag 
has 709 seats. 
Half of the seats 
in Germany's 
lower house, the 
Bundestag, are 
selected by party 
list/proportional 
representation 
and the other 
half are selected 
in single-
member districts 
(Rule, 1987) 
299 1 No Mixed Parliamentary 20 
6 Japan The upper 
house, the 
300 1 No Mixed Parliamentary 56 
14
9 
  
House of 
Councillors has 
242 members. 
The election 
period is 
seventeen days 
for the House of 
Councillors 
elections. 
7 New 
Zealand 
In New Zealand 
there are 120 
seats, with 
seventy to be 
electorate and 
the remaining 
seats filled from 
party lists so that 
each party’s 
share of the total 
number of seats 
reflected its 
share of the total 
number of party 
votes (Boston, et 
al, 1997). 
70 1 Yes Mixed Parliamentary 152 
15
0 
  
8 Peru Peru uses the 
D’Hondt 
formula to elect 
its 130- member 
Congress. Most 
of Peru’s 
twenty- six 
districts elect 
between two 
and five seats, 
and there is a 
nationwide 5 
percent 
threshold. 
25 5.2 Yes Proportional Presidential 10 
9 Poland The Lower 
House in Poland 
consists in 460 
deputies. 
Representatives 
are selected as 
though the 
whole state were 
a single 
constituency and 
allocating seats 
to the different 
41 11.22 Yes Proportional Parliamentary 19 
15
1 
  
parties in 
proportion to 
their percentage 
of the vote. 
10 South 
Korea 
The Korean 
National 
Assembly's has 
300 seats, 253 are 
elected from 
single-member 
constituencies 
by plurality 
rules, the 
remaining 47 are 
allocated from 
party lists 
245 1 No Mixed Parliamentary 61 
11 Switzerland The national 
house has 200 
seats. These 
members are 
apportioned to 
the Swiss 
cantons in 
proportion to 
their population. 
26 7.6 Yes Proportional Parliamentary 160 
15
2 
  
12 Thailand The lower house 
has 500 seats 
elected: 375 
Members of 
Parliament will 
come from 
single-member 
constituencies, 
whereas 125 
Members of 
Parliament will 
come from a 
closed-list 
proportional 
system. 
157 2.55 No Mixed Parliamentary 2 
13 United 
States 
Voters cast 
ballots not 
directly for those 
offices, but 
instead for 
members of the 
U.S. Electoral 
College, known 
as electors. These 
electors then in 
turn cast direct 
435 1 No Majoritarian Presidential 209 
15
3 
  
votes, known as 
electoral votes, 
for president, 
and for vice 
president. 
 Source: CSES Module 3 and the Boix-Miller-Rosato Dichotomous Coding of Democracy 
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Appendix 4.  
Figure 18. Heteroscedasticity test 
Source: Own analysis and elaboration 
Table 18. Breusch-Pagan test 
Number of observations= 2005 
F (7, 1997) = 27.52 
Prob >F= 0.0000 
Source: Own analysis and elaboration 
Table 19. White test 
Number of observations= 2005 
F (2, 2002) = 27.52 
Prob >F= 0.0000 
Source: Own analysis and elaboration 
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Table 20. OLS model for 2015 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Amount Number of projects 
   
Divided government -0.640 -0.231 
 (2.578) (0.300) 
Constant 19.15*** 4.084*** 
 (1.692) (0.212) 
   
Observations 2,024 2,024 
R-squared 0.000 0.000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: Own analysis and elaboration 
 
157 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Abramson, Paul R. and William Claggett. 1991. “Racial Differences in Self-
Reported and Validated Turnout in the 1998 Presidential Election.” Journal of 
Politics, 53: 186-97. 
Alesina, A. and Rosenthal, H. 1989. “Partisan Cycles in Congressional Elections 
and the Macroeconomy” in American Political Science Review, 83, pp. 373-98. 
Alesina, A. and Rosenthal, H. 1995. Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the 
Economy. Cambridge University Press, New York. 
Ames, Barry; Andy Baker; and Lucio R. Renno. 2008. “Split-ticket voting as the 
rule: Voters and permanent divided government in Brazil”, in Electoral Studies, 
doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2008.06.005 
Arian, A., and Weiss S. 1969. “Split-Ticket Voting in Israel” in The Western 
Political Quarterly, 22, 375-389. 
Bawn, K., 1999. “Voter responses to electoral complexity: Ticket splitting, rational 
voters, and representation in the Federal Republic of Britany” in British Journal 
Political Science 29, 487-505. 
Bean, C. S., and Wattenberg, M. P. (1998). Attitudes towards divided government 
and ticket- splitting in Australia and the United States. Australian Journal of 
Political Science, 33, 25-36. 
Belli, R., Traugott, M., Young, M., McGonagle, K. 1999. “Reducing vote 
overreporting in surveys – social desirability, memory failure, and source 
monitoring.” Public Opinion Quarterly, 63: 90–108 
Beltran del Rio, Pascal. 2013. “Los gobernadores y el Presidente” in Excelsior, 
March 10. Published on line https://www.excelsior.com.mx/opinion/pascal-
beltran-del-rio/2013/03/10/888200 
Benoit, K., Giannetti, D., and Laver, M. 2005. Voter strategies with restricted choice 
menus. New York: NewYork University Press. 
158 
 
Benton, A. L., and Smith, H. 2016. “The Impact of Parties and Elections on 
Municipal Debt Policy in Mexico” in Governance: An International Journal of 
Policy, Administration, and Institutions, Volume 30, Issue 4, October. 
Berenschot, Ward. 2018. “The Political Economy of Clientelism: A Comparative 
Study of Indonesia’s Patronage Democracy” in Comparative Political Studies. 
51. 001041401875875. 10.1177/0010414018758756. 
Bey, Marguerite. 2007. “Alternancia política y cambios en el escenario político 
local: el caso de Cuquío”, Espiral, Estudios sobre Estado y Sociedad, Vol.
 XIII, No.38, Enero-Abril. 
Blanco, Carlos. 2011. “Reform of the State and Democracy in Latin America.” In 
Latin America 2060: Consolidation or Crisis?, September 2011, The Frederick 
S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future.  
Browning, Clyde E. 1973. “The Geography of Federal Outlays” in Studies in 
Geography, No. 4. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Department of 
Geography. 
Burden Barry C. 2009. “Candidate-driven ticket splitting in the 2000 Japanese 
elections” in Electoral Studies, 28, 33-40. 
Burden, B. C., and Helmke, G. 2009. “The comparative study of split-ticket 
voting” in Electoral Studies, 28, 1-7. 
Burden, Barry C. and David C. Kimball. 1998. “A New Approach to the Study of 
Ticket Splitting” in The American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 3, Sep., pp. 
533-544 
Burden, Barry C. and David C. Kimball. 2002. Why Americans Split Their Tickets: 
Campaigns, Competition, and Divided Government. University of Michigan Press, 
Ann Arbor. 
Cabrero, Enrique. 2013. “Fiscal Federalism in Mexico: Distortions and Structural 
Traps” in Urban Public Economics Review, online, 
http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=50428804001> ISSN 1697-6223 
Calvo, Murillo M. 2013. “Cuando los partidos políticos se encuentran con sus 
votantes: un análisis de los vínculos políticos a través de las redes 
159 
 
partidarias y las expectativas distributivas en Argentina y Chile” in América 
Latina Hoy, 65(0): 15-44. 
Calvo E., Marcelo Escolar and Julia Pomares. 2008. “Ballot design and split ticket 
voting in multiparty systems: Experimental evidence on information effects 
and vote choice” in Electoral Studies 28, pp. 218-231. 
Campbell, Angus and Warren E. Miller. 1957. “The Motivational Basis of Straight 
and Split Ticket Voting” in The American Political Science Review, Vol. 51, No. 2, 
June, pp. 293-312. 
Carsey, Thomas M. and Geoffrey C. Layman. 2004. “Policy Balancing and 
Preferences for Party Control of Government” in Political Research Quarterly, 
December, vol. 57, no. 4 541-550 
Chand, Vikram. 2001. Mexico’s Political Awakening. Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press. 
Chibber, P.K., and Kollman, K. 2004. The Formation of National Party Systems: 
Federalism and Party Competition in Canada, Great Britain, India and the United 
States. Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
Cho, Wendy K. Tam and Gaines, B. J. 2004. “The Limits of Ecological Inference: 
The Case of Split-ticket voting” in American Journal of Political Science, 48: 152–
171 
Cho, Wendy K. Tam. 1998. “If the Assumption Fits…: A Comment on the King 
Ecological Inference Solutions” in Political Analysis, 7:143-63. 
Cleave, N., P. J. Brown and C. D. Payne. 1995. “Evaluation of Methods for 
Ecological Inference” in Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A (Statistics 
in Society), Vol. 158, No. 1, pp. 55-72 
Colantoni, Claude S., Terrence J. Levesque, and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1975. 
“Campaign Resource Allocation Under the Electoral College” in American 
Political Science Review 69: 41-161. 
Cox, Gary W. and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1986. “Electoral Politics as a 
Redistributive Game” in The Journal of Politics, Vol. 48, No. 2, May, pp. 370 
– 389 
160 
 
Crown, David. 2005. “Crossing Party Lines: Volatility and Ticket Splitting in 
Mexico (1994–2000)” in Bulletin of Latin American Research, Vol. 24, No. 1, 
pp. 1–22. 
Dasgupta, Sugato, Amrita Dhillon, and Bhaskar Dutta. 2008. “Electoral Goals and 
Centre State Transfers: A Theoretical Model and Empirical Evidence from 
India” in Journal of Development Economics, 88 (1), 103–19. 
della Porta, D. and A. Vannucci. 1999. Corrupt Exchanges: Actors, Resources, and 
Mechanisms of Political Corruption (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1999). 
Diaz Cayeros, Alberto, and Gustavo Merino. 1996. "Federal Resource Allocation 
under a Dominant Party: Regional Financial Transfers in Mexico." Paper 
presented to the American Political Science Association San Francisco, 29 
August-1 September.  
Dixit, Avinash, and John Londregan. 1995. “Redistributive Politics and Economic 
Eficiency” in American Political Science Review 89: 856-866.  
Dixit, Avinash, and John Londregan. 1996. “The Determinants of Success of 
Special Interests in Redistributive Politics” in Journal of Politics, 58: 1132-
1155. 
Downs, A. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. Harper, New York. 
Duncan, Otis Dudley, and Beverly Davis. 1953. “An alternative to Ecological 
Correlation” in American Sociological Review, 18: 665-66. 
Duverger, M. (1954). Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern 
State. New York: Wiley. 
Elff, M., Gschwend, T. and Johnston, R.J., 2008. “Ignoramus, ignorabimus? On 
uncertainty in ecological inference” in Political Analysis 16, 70–92. 
Elklit, Jørgen and Ulrik Kjær. 2005. “Are Danes More Inclined to Ticket Splitting 
than the Swedes and the English?” in Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 28, 
No. 2, 125-139. 
Erie, Stephen P. 1978. “Politics, the Public Sector, and Irish Social Mobility: San 
Francisco, 1870-1900” in Western Political Quarterly 31: 274-289. 
161 
 
Erikson, R. 1988. “The Puzzle of Midterm Loss” in The Journal of Politics, 50, No. 
4, 1011-1029. 
Fachelli, S., Lucas Ronconi, and Juan Sangui. 2006. “Poverty and Employability 
Effects of Workfare Programs in Argentina” PPMA Working Paper no. 
2006-14, June 1. 
Feedman, David A., Stephen P. Klein, Michal Ostland, and Michel R. Roberts. 
1998. “Review of A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem” in Journal 
of the American Statistical Association, 93: 1518-22. 
Fiorina, Morris P. 1994. “Divided Government in the American States: a Byproduct 
of Legislative Professionalism?” American Political Science Review, vol. 88, 
No. 2, June. 
Fiorina, Morris P. 1996. Divided Government, second ed. Allyn and Bacon, 
Needham Heights, MA.  
Flamand, L. 2006. “El juego de la distribución de recursos en un sistema federal” 
in Política y Gobierno, XIII (2), 315-359. 
García, Imelda. 2016. “El truco de los fondos” in Reporte Índigo, published online 
on october 27, 2016 in https://www.reporteindigo.com/reporte/pef-
millones-de-pesos/ 
Gibson, Edward. 2005. “Boundary Control Subnational Authoritarianism in 
Democratic Countries” in World Politics 58, October, 101–32. 
Goodman, Leo. 1953. “Ecological regression and the behavior of individuals” in 
American Sociological Review 18: 663–64 
Goodman, Leo. 1959. “Some alternatives to ecological correlation” in American 
Journal of Sociology 64: 610–25 
Green, Kenneth. 2007. Why Dominant Parties Lose, New York, Cambridge 
University Press 
Grofman, B., Koetzle, W., McDonald, M., Brunell, T.L., 2000. “A new look at split 
ticket outcomes for House and president: The comparative midpoints 
model” in Journal of Politics 62, 35-50. 
162 
 
Gschwend Thomas, Ron Johnston and Charles Pattie. 2003. “Split-Ticket Patterns 
in Mixed-Member Proportional Election Systems: Estimates and Analyses 
of Their Spatial Variation at the German Federal Election, 1998” in British 
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 1, January, pp. 109-127. 
Gschwend Thomas. 2007. “Ticket splitting and Strategic Voting under Mixed 
Electoral Rules: Evidence from Germany” in European Journal of Political 
Research 46, pp. 1-23. 
Harris, M., and Doron G. 1999. “Assessing the Electoral Reform of 1992 and Its 
Impact on the Elections of 1996 and 1999” in Israel Studies, 4, 16-39. 
Helmke, Gretchen. 2009. “Ticket splitting as electoral insurance: The Mexico 2000 
elections” in Electoral Studies 28, 70–78. 
Hernandez-Rodriguez, Rogelio. 2003. “The Renovation of Old Institutions: State 
Governors and the Political Transition in Mexico” in Latin American Politics 
and Society, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Winter), pp. 97-127. 
Herrmann, M., and Pappi, F.U. 2008. “Strategic voting in German constituencies” 
in Electoral Studies, 27, 228–244. 
Hibbs, D. 1977. "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy" in American Political 
Science Review, 71(4), pp. 1466-1487 
Hogan, Robert. E. 2005. “Gubernatorial Coattail Effects in State Legislative 
Elections” in Political Research Quarterly 58, 587-597. 
Ingberman, Daniel and John Villani. 1993. “An institutional Theory of Divided 
Government and Party Polarization” in American Journal of Political Science 
37: 429-71. 
Jesse, E. 1988. “Split-voting in the Federal Republic of Germany: An analysis of the 
federal elections from 1953 to 1987” in Electoral Studies, 7, 109–124. 
Johnston, M. 1997. “Public Officials, Private Interests, and Sustainable Democracy: 
When Politics and Corruption Meet” in K.A. Elliot (ed.), Corruption and the 
Global Economy (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 
1997) pp. 61–82. 
163 
 
Johnston, R. J., A. M. Hay, and P. J. Taylor. 1982. “Estimating the Sources of Spatial 
Change in Election Results: A Multiproportional Matrix Approach” in 
Environment and Planning A, 14:951–961. 
Johnston, R.J. and Pattie, C.J., 2002. “Campaigning and split-ticket voting in new 
electoral systems: The first MMP elections in New Zealand, Scotland, and 
Wales” in Electoral Studies 21, 583–600. 
Kang, Woo Chang. 2014. “Presidential Pork Barrel Politics with Polarized Voters” 
August 26. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2543761 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2543761 
Karp, Jeffrey A. and Marshall W. Garland. 2007. “Ideological Ambiguity and Split 
Ticket Voting” in Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 4, Dec., pp. 722-
732. 
Karp, Jeffrey A., Jack Vowles, Susan A. Banducci, and Todd Donovan. 2002. 
“Strategic voting, party activity, and candidate effects: testing explanations 
for split voting in New Zealand’s new mixed system” in Electoral Studies 21, 
1–22. 
Kedar, O. 2006. “How voters work around institutions: Policy balancing in 
staggered elections” in Electoral Studies 25, 509-527. 
Kedar, O., 2005. “When moderate voters prefer extreme parties: Policy balancing 
in parliamentary elections” in American Political Science Review, 99(02), 
pp.185-199. 
King, G. 1997. A solution to the Ecological Inference Problem, Princeton Unviersity 
Press, Princeton 
Klesner Joseph. 2005. “Electoral Competition and the New Party System in 
Mexico” in Latin American Politics and Society - Volume 47, Number 2, 
Summer, pp. 103-142 
Kostadinova, T. 2006. “Party Strategies and Voter Behavior in the East European 
Mixed Election Systems” in Party Politics, 12, 121–143. 
164 
 
Kramer, Gerald H. 1964. “A Decision-Theoretic Analysis of a Problem in Political 
Campaigning.” In Mathematical Applications in Political Science, volume 11, 
edited by Joseph L. Bernd. Dallas, TX: Southern Methodist University. 
Kriner, D., and Reeves, A. 2015. “Presidential Particularism and Divide-the-Dollar 
Politics” in American Political Science Review, 109(1), 155-171. 
doi:10.1017/S0003055414000598. 
Laborde, Maria, Jacaranda Perez and Ernesto Ramos. 2012. “El voto dividido y la 
compra de votos en las elecciones presidenciales de 2012” in Fepade Difunde, 
First Edition, Number 24. 
Lachat, Romain. 2005. “Strategic choices? Modelling split-ticket voting and its 
causes in a complex electoral setting” Paper to be presented at the Annual 
Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, Toronto, July 
3-6, 2005. http://www.romain-lachat.ch/papers/ispp2005.pdf 
Lacy, D. and Emerson M.S. Niou. 1998. “Elections in Double-Member Districts 
with Nonseparable Preferences” in Journal of Theoretical Politics 10:89-110. 
Lacy, D. and Paolino, P. 1998. “Downsian voting and the separation of powers” in 
American Journal of Political Science 24, 1180-1199. 
Langston, Joy. 2010. “Governors and “Their” Deputies: New Legislative Principals 
in Mexico” in Legislative Studies Quarterly, XXXV, 2, May. 
Lawson, Chappell, et. al. 2013. The Mexico 2012 Panel Study.  
http://mexicopanelstudy.mit.edu/ 
Lechner, Michael. 2010. “The Estimation of Causal Effects by Difference-in-
Difference Methods” in Foundations and Trends in Econometrics, Vol. 4, No. 
3, 165–224 
Levitt Steven D. and James M. Snider, 1997. “The impact of Federal Spending on 
House Election Outcomes” in The Journal of Political Economy, vol. 105, No. 
1, Feb, pp. 30-53 
Lewis-Beck, Michael S. and Richard Nadeau. 2004. “Split-ticket voting: The Effects 
of Cognitive Madisonianism” in The Journal of Politics, Vol. 66, No. 1, Feb., 
pp. 97-112. 
165 
 
Lijphart, A. 1994. Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven 
Democracies, 1945-1990. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lindbeck, Assar, and Jorgen W. Weibull. 1987. “Balanced-Budget Redistribution 
as the Outcome of Political Competition” in Public Choice 52: 273-297. 
Little, W. 1996. “Corruption and Democracy in Latin America” IDS Bulletin 1996 
(27), 64–70. 
Lizzeri, Alessandro and Nicola Persico. 2001. “The Provision of Public Goods 
under Alternative Electoral Incentives” in American Economic Review. 91: 
225-239.  
Magaloni, B., Diaz-Cayeros, A., and Estévez, F. 2007. “Clientelism and portfolio 
diversification: A model of electoral investment with applications to 
Mexico” in H. Kitschelt and S. Wilkinson (Eds.), Patrons, Clients and Policies: 
Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition (pp. 182-205). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
doi:10.1017/CBO9780511585869.008 
Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Survival and its Demise in 
Mexico. Cambridge University Press. 
Marshall et al. 2008. Polity IV Project: Dataset User’s Manual, Center for Systemic 
Peace. 
McAlliser, Ian, and Robert Darcy. 1992. “Sources of split-ticket voting in the 1988 
American Elections” in Political Studies 40:695-712. 
McAllister, Ian and Stephen White. 2000. “Split ticket voting in the 1995 Russian 
Duma elections” in Electoral Studies 19, 563–576. 
McCue, Kenneth. 2001. “The Statistical Foundations of the ‘EI’ Method” in 
American Statistician, 55: 106-11. 
Mebane Jr. W.R. 2000. “Coordination, moderation, and institutional balancing in 
American presidential and House elections” in American Political Science 
Review 94, 37-57 
166 
 
México Evalúa. 2018. “Fondos del Ramo 23: ¿sinónimo de control político?” in La 
Caja Negra, 9 de enero de 2018, 
https://www.mexicoevalua.org/cajanegra/fondos-del-ramo-23/ 
México Evalúa. 2018. “Arquitectura del Ramo 23,” retrieved from 
https://www.mexicoevalua.org/2018/02/27/arquitectura-del-ramo-23/ 
Meyer, Lorenzo. 1978. Los inicios de la institucionalización. Mexico City: El Colegio 
de México. 
Moreno, Alejandro. 2003. El votante mexicano: democracia, actitudes políticas, conducta 
electoral (first edition), México, Fondo de Cultura Económica. 
Moreno, Alejandro. 2009. La decisión electoral. Votantes, partidos y democracia en 
México. México: Miguel Ángel Porrúa, 448 pp. 
Moser, R. G., and Scheiner, E. 2005. “Strategic Ticket Splitting and the Personal 
Vote in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems” in Legislative Studies Quarterly, 
30, 259-276. 
Moser, R., and Scheiner, E. 2009. “Strategic voting in established and new 
democracies: Ticket splitting in mixed-member electoral systems” in 
Electoral Studies, 28, 51-61. 
N. Cleave, P. J. Brown and C. D. Payne.1995. “Evaluation of Methods for 
Ecological Inference,” in Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A 
(Statistics in Society). Vol. 158, No. 1, pp. 55-72. 
Nacif, Benito. 2006. The Fall of the Dominant Presidency: Lawmaking Under Divided 
Government in Mexico, Mexico, Centro de Investigación y Docencia 
Económicas. 
Navia, Patricio and José Luis Saldaña. 2015. “Mis-coordination and political 
misalignments in ticket-splitting: the case of Chile, 2005–2009” in Journal of 
Contemporary Politics 21, 485-503. 
Nordhaus, W. 1975, "The Political Business Cycle" in Review of Economic Studies, 
42(2), pp. 169-190. 
167 
 
Núñez González, Leonardo. 2018. “El poder de Hacienda y el caso de Javier 
Corral”, Animal Político, 15 de enero, 
https://www.animalpolitico.com/blogueros-blog-
invitado/2018/01/15/poder-hacienda-caso-javier-corral/ 
Ochoa Reza, Enrique and Alberto Saracho. 2006. “Voto cruzado” in Letras Libres, 
Year 8th, No. 93, 54-55. 
Ori Rosen, Wenxin Jiang, Gary King, and Martin A Tanner. 2001. “Bayesian and 
Frequentist Inference for Ecological Inference: The RxC Case” in Statistica 
Neerlandica, 55: 134–156.  
Ortiz, Francisco. 2018. “El Ramo 23, pacto de impunidad” in Sin Embargo, enero 
26, https://www.sinembargo.mx/26-01-2018/3377847 
Owens, John R., and Larry L. Wade. 1984. “Federal Spending in Congressional 
Districts” in Western Political Quarterly, 37: 404-423. 
Pappi, F. U., and Thurner, P. W. 2002. “Electoral behavior in a two‐vote system: 
Incentives for ticket splitting in German Bundestag elections” in European 
Journal of Political Research, 41, 207-232. 
Park, W.-H., 2008. Ecological Inference and Aggregate Analysis of Elections. The 
University of Michigan Doctoral Dissertation 
Park, Won-ho, Michel J. Hammer, and Daniel R. Biggers. 2014. “Ecological 
inference under unfavorable conditions: Straight and split-ticket voting in 
diverse settings and small samples” in Electoral Studies, 36: 192-203. 
Persson and Tabellini. 2004. “Constitutional Rules and Fiscal Policy Outcomes” in 
The American Economic Review, Vol. 94, No. 1, Mar., pp. 25-45. 
Presser, S., 1990. “Can changes in context reduce vote overreporting in surveys?” 
in Public Opinion Quarterly, 54: 586–593. 
Rae, D. 1971. The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
168 
 
Ramírez Rodríguez, R., and Erquizio Espinal, A. 2012. “Análisis del ciclo político 
electoral a partir de variables de gasto público por entidad federativa en 
México, 1993-2000” in Paradigma económico, 4(3), 5-27. 
Ramírez, E., and Hernández, E. 2019. “Ramo 23, sólo para beneficio de los priistas” 
in El Sol de Mexico, published on January 14, 2019. Retrieved from 
https://www.elsoldemexico.com.mx/mexico/politica/ramo-23-solo-para-
beneficio-de-los-priistas-2919478.html 
Reyes-Hernández, M., and Mejía-Reyes, P. 2016. “Ciclo político presupuestal en 
México, 1980-2014. Un enfoque econométrico” in Gestión y Política Pública, 
25(2), 415-445. 
Reynolds, A., and Steenbergen, M. 2006. “How the world votes: the political 
consequences of ballot design, innovation and manipulation” in Electoral 
Studies, 25, 570–598. 
Ritt, Leonard G. 1976. “Committee Position, Seniority, and the Distribution of 
Government Expenditures” in Public Policy 24: 469-497. 
Rivers, Douglas. 1998. “Review of a Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem 
by Gary King” in American Political Science Review, 92: 442-43. 
Roberts, J. M. 2009. Bicameralism, Ballot Type, and Split-TicketVoting. North 
Carolina: University of North Carolina. 
Roscoe, Douglas. 2003. “The Choosers or the Choices? Voter Characteristics and 
the Structure of Electoral Competition as Explanations for Ticket 
Splitting” in The Journal of Politics, Vol. 65, No. 4 Nov., pp. 1147-1164. 
Rosenzweig, Steven. 2015. “Does electoral competition affect public goods 
provision in dominant-party regimes? Evidence from Tanzania” in 
Electoral Studies, 39: 72-84.  
Rusk, J. G. 1970. “The Effect of the Australian Ballot Reform on Split Ticket 
Voting: 1876-1908” in The American Political Science Review, 64: 1220-1238. 
Santos, F.N. 2015. “Presidentialism, Decentralization, and Distributive Politics in 
Latin America” UCLA. ProQuest ID: Santos_ucla_0031D_13255. Merritt ID: 
169 
 
ark:/13030/m5vd968r. Retrieved from 
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8v85r1g1 
Saunders, Kyle L., Alan I. Abramowitz and Jonathan Williamson. 2005. “A New 
Kind of Balancing Act: Electoral Certainty and Ticket-Splitting in the 1996 
and 2000 Elections” in Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 58, No. 1, Mar., pp. 
69-78. 
Schady, Norbert. 1999. “The political economy of expenditures by the Peruvian 
Social Fund (FONCODES), 1991-95” The World Bank, Policy Research 
Working Paper Series. 94. 10.2307/2586013. 
Scheve, Kenneth and Michael Tomz. 1999. “Electoral surprise and the Midterm 
Loss in U.S. Congressional Elections” in British Journal of Political Science 
29:507-21.  
Selvin, H. C. 1958. “Durkheim’s ‘suicide’ and problems of empirical research” in 
American Journal of Sociology, 63: 607–619. 
Serra, Gilles. 2013. “Was Mexico’s 2012 Election Undemocratic? Assessing the 
Fraud Accusations.” Working paper 259, Centro de Investigación y 
Docencias Económicas. 
Shugart, Matthew Soberg. 1995. “The electoral cycle and institutional sources of 
divided presidential government” in American Political Science Review 89: 
327-43. 
Silver, Brian D., Barbara A. Anderson, and Paul R. Abramson. 1986. “Who 
Overreports Voting?” in American Political Science Review, 80: 613-24.  
Smith, Charles E., Robert D. Brown, John M. Bruce, and L. Marvin Overby. 1999. 
“Policy Balancing and Voting for Congress in the 1996 National Election” 
in American Journal of Political Science 43:737-64. 
Snyder, James M., Jr. 1989. “Election Goals and the Allocation of Campaign 
Resources” in Econometrica 57: 637-660. 
Soto Elidet. 2017. ¿Qué es el Ramo 23 y por qué los diputados se pelean por él? In 
Nacion 321. October 5, 2017. https://www.nacion321.com/congreso/que-es-
el-ramo-23-y-por-que-los-diputados-se-pelean-por-el 
170 
 
Sung, Hung. 2004. “Democracy and political corruption: A cross-national 
comparison” in Crime, Law and Social Change 41: 179–194. 
Taagepera, R., and Shugart, M. S. (1989). Seats and Votes: The Effects and 
Determinants of Electoral Systems. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Takahashi, Yuriko. 2007. "Explaining Split-ticket voting in the 2000 Federal 
Elections in Mexico" in Annals of Latin American Studies 27: 1-30, 2007. 
Tam, W. 2005. Political insecurity and clientelist politics: the case of Singapore. 
Typescript. University of Chicago. 
Tarrance and DeVries, 1998; Kedar, O. 2005. “When moderate voters prefer 
extreme parties: Policy balancing in parliamentary elections” in American 
Political Science Review 99, 185-199  
Thomsen, Soren Risbjerg, Sten Berglund, and Ingemar Wörlund. 1991. “Assessing 
the validity of the logit method for ecological inference” in European Journal 
of Political Research, 19: 441–477 
Thomsen, Soren Risbjerg. 1987. Danish Elections 1920-79. A Logit Approach to 
Ecological Analysis and Inference. Århus: Politica. 210 pp. 
Timmons, J., and Broid, D. 2013. “The Political Economy of Municipal Transfers: 
Evidence from Mexico” in Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 43(4), 551-579. 
van de Walle, N. 2007. “Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss? The Evolution 
of Political Clientelism in Africa” 50-67. 10.1017/CBO9780511585869.002. 
World Bank. 1999. World development report. Washington, DC, USA: World Bank.  
World Bank. 2000. World development report. Washington DC, USA: World Bank. 
Wright, G. 1974. “The Political Economy of New Deal Spending: An Econometric 
Analysis” in The Review of Economics and Statistics, 56(1), 30-38. 
doi:10.2307/1927524 
Wright, G. 1990. “Misreports of Vote Choice in the 1988 NES Senate Election Study 
“in Legislative Studies Quarterly, 15: 543-63. 
  
171 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
172 
 
173 
 
174 
 
